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The Internet is the ultimate memory entity, storing unimaginable amounts of information 
and capable of retrieving target pieces in less than a second. Thanks to tools like Google, 
resorting to this entity when trying to remember or learn facts has become as natural for 
people as eating when feeling hungry. Recent evidence suggests that embracing the 
Internet as a memory resource deregulates metacognition because people conflate 
knowledge accessed online with their own. The current research shows that this conflation 
entails a “feeling of already knowing” that, in consumer contexts, leads to overconfidence 
in decision skills. Most importantly, and contrasting with the common view of 
overconfidence as a trap, this research proposes that, albeit illusory, Google-induced 
choice confidence (the belief that the chosen option is superior to the dismissed ones) 
gives rise to affective expectations that spill over into subjective experiences. In essence, 
the Internet entails a self-fulfilling prophecy where it misguides people into believing that 
they made an objectively optimal decision but also leads them to have subjectively better 
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What we see and hear on the screen is part of who we become. 
Fred McFeely Rogers (or simply Mister Rogers) 
 
“Asking” Google has become an automatic reaction when people experience doubt 
(Sparrow & Chatman, 2013; Ferguson, McLean, & Risko, 2015). Not surprisingly, by 
August 2018, Google alone had processed over 1,241,900,000,000 searches in the year 
(Google Search Statistics, 2018) – based on Google’s share of online search around the 
same period (Net Marketshare, 2018), it is estimated that over 1,655,866,666,667 online 
searches had been processed by then if we take other search tools into account. 
This incredible reliance on the Internet and tools like Google is not unjustified. The 
Internet is the ultimate memory machine and Google bridges our memory needs to this 
machine’s powers. Although cognitive offloading is not a new strategy to overcome the 
human biological limitations of knowledge storage (Risko & Gilbert, 2016), the Internet 
expands the capacity and the use of external memory aids to unprecedented levels 
(Ward, 2013a). 
As it happens when unparalleled phenomena evolve to the point where they are 
impossible to ignore, researchers and thinkers have started to debate where the 
ubiquitous dependence of our society on the Internet is heading, and opinions are 
divided. For instance, responding to a survey with technology experts, MIT’s Micah 
Altman showed enthusiasm with the broad and democratic access to useful information 
that the Internet has enabled (Anderson & Lee, 2018). On the other hand, in the same 
survey, author Nicholas Carr (see Carr, 2008; 2010) expressed increasing concerns and 
emphasized potential cognitive impairments associated with the heavy use of the 
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Internet and devices that keep us connected, including phenomena related to memory 
and analytical and problem-solving skills. 
Indeed, along the lines of Nicholas Carr’s perspective, there are now reasons to 
believe that when we embrace the Internet as a cognitive expansion of our own 
cognitive capacities, our human brains respond in unanticipated ways (Sparrow & 
Chatman, 2013; Ward, 2013a; Wegner & Ward, 2013). More and more, research 
provides evidence of such responses. For instance, it has been shown that using 
computers to learn new facts stimulates storing location knowledge (e.g., where the fact 
can be found in the computer) in memory, but reduces the capacity to remember the 
facts that should have been learned (Sparrow et al., 2011). At the same time, when 
processing written information presented on a screen (vs. on paper), people seem to 
overestimate how much they learned (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2011). In a similar vein,  
research shows that when a product is presented along with large amounts of related 
information, reminders of the availability of that information online makes consumers 
rely more on their own capacity to remember it and have stronger purchase intentions 
(Bhargave, Mantonakis, & White, 2016). 
As implied in the examples above, a specially interesting category of outcomes that 
seems to emerge from the partnership between our human brains and the Internet 
consists in metacognitive errors. In particular, the overestimation of how much we (with 
our human brains) know, retain, and can achieve. Recent studies implicate our pervasive 
habit of Internet search in problems of metacognitive regulation. Pioneer research in this 
area shows that accessing facts on Google inflates cognitive self-esteem, boosting 
people’s reliance on their transactive memory, intelligence, and internal memory 
capacities (Ward, 2013b). Relatedly, studies conducted in parallel to the present 
research suggest that when using Google to access study materials, people tend to stop 
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the studying session prematurely – because Internet search inflates their self-assessed 
expertise in the subject matter – while also not retaining the information from those 
materials (Fisher, Smiley, & Grillo, 2018). 
The current research turns attention to Google-induced metacognitive errors in a 
consumer context. Reports indicate that in certain categories (travel, beauty, and 
electronics), nearly 60% of consumers look for information online before their purchase 
decisions (Nielsen, 2016). The increasing prevalence of Internet search in consumer 
learning and decision processes has been clearly noticed in marketing research (e.g., 
Jerath, Ma, & Park, 2014; Johnson, Moe, Fader, Bellman, & Lohse, 2004; Mathwick & 
Rigdon, 2004). Predominantly, researchers in this area tend to focus on how consumers 
engage in search activities online to assist their decision process. However, searching 
the Internet for topics of our interest and pursuing and consuming objects and 
experiences related to these topics are things that people do parallel to each other, 
without search activities being necessarily intended to inform decisions. Here, I focus 
on distinctive consequences of using Internet search to learn facts that pertain to the 
same domain of a future personal decision, in particular how this use of the Internet can 
change the way consumers feel about and experience the outcome of their choices. 
As a starting point, I propose that among the cognitive skills that are magnified in 
our self-perception due to access to knowledge through online search, there are skills 
used in decision-making settings (Study 1). Because of this, decision-makers under the 
influence of Google effects have an inflated confidence in their capacity to make high-
quality decisions (Studies 2 and 3). This miscalibrated confidence leads to the 
overestimation of the quality of their choices (Studies 4 and 5). The dangers of 
overconfidence in decision skills and choice quality are discussed, but focus is driven to 
a possibly desirable downstream consequence. The positive estimations of choice 
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quality implie that there are positive expectations about choice outcomes. Based on this 
implication, I propose that when people make experiential choices1, their subjective 
experience can be embellished by their expectations about the selected option, even 
when these expectations stem from a positive illusion such as overconfidence in 
decision abilities driven by Google effects (also Studies 4 and 5). In essence, this 
research shows that when Google induces miscalibration, it entails a self-fulfilling 
prophecy where people’s misguided beliefs that they are capable of choosing 
objectively superior options lead them to have subjectively better experiences with the 
outcomes of their choices. 
Five experiments illuminate the process of this self-fulfilling prophecy, from how 
Google inflates confidence in decision abilities to the downstream influence on 
enjoyment of personal experiences. The first set of experiments explored the effect of 
Google on self-perceived decision abilities. These studies make an important 
contribution to empirical research on Google effects and metacognition not only by 
revealing the Google-induced miscalibration of decision skills, but also by examining 
consequences in experiential choices, which depart from the factual nature of previous 
cognitive tasks used to explore metacognitive errors due to Internet search (Fisher, 
Goddu, & Keil, 2015; Ward, 2013b) in the sense that they involve subjective outcomes 
(i.e., there is no objectively right or wrong answer – or, in this case, decision). 
Moreover, a unique demonstration of the mechanism of Google-induced overconfidence 
is presented in two experiments of this initial set. 
The second set of studies highlights experiential consequences of the miscalibration 
of decision skills. The two experiments in this set combine the findings of the previous 
                                                          
1 The term “experiential choices” is used here to refer to contexts where people choose among options of 
personal experiences, as opposed to material possessions or intangible instrumental products (e.g., 
financial products, insurance plans). This is not the same use of the term that appears in Choi and 
Fishbach’s (2011) research and related works. 
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three studies with prior research on the influence of affective expectations on feelings 
about and perceptions of personal experiences. Previous research has shown that 
external information can alter expectations about an upcoming event and these 
expectations color how the event is subjectively experienced (Klaaren, Hodges, & 
Wilson, 1994). The studies presented here reveal that internal information related to 
beliefs about one’s own capacity to make optimal decisions can alter expectations as 
well and, consequently, change subjective experiences. Specifically, the experimental 
manipualtions in these studies miscalibrated such beliefs with Google search tasks, 
eliciting beliefs about choice quality based on self-assessed decision skills. Together, 





RESEARCH BACKGROUND I: VIRTUAL CONFIDENCE IN DECISION 
SKILLS 
 
Evolutionarily, humans managed to navigate through ways of life and social 
organization that increasingly rewarded knowledge and access to information despite 
natural limitations of the human brain by resorting to external memory resources. 
Everyday examples of such resources are objects and devices like shopping lists, 
memos, notebooks, timers, and calendars (Harris, 1982). Another important category of 
external resources are other human beings. As social animals, people learned to 
coordinate responsibility over knowledge in different domains with human memory 
partners. In these networks, some people become experts in certain domains (e.g., Ward 
& Lynch, Jr., 2018) and, thus, release others from the burdens of mastering that 
knowledge and enable them to become experts in other areas. The memory systems 
where information is spread across internal and several external memory resources are 
what Daniel Wegner (1987) defined as transactive memory. 
While transactive memory is an old cognitive solution, and numerous technologies 
have assisted the use of external memory in these systems since humans started painting 
cave walls to document their existence, it has never encountered such an impactful force 
like the Internet, with its unparalleled capacity to store and retrieve information through 
a single touch point: Google. Understandably, the Internet overrides old devices and 
human memory partners, becoming the ultimate memory solution (Ward, 2013a; 2013b; 
Wegner & Ward, 2013). Perhaps even our own internal memory is subject to be 
overthrown – since relying on information from the Internet seems to reduce our 
capacity to retain that information (Fisher et al., 2018; Sparrow et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, we seem to be largely unaware of the proportions of our reliance on 
knowledge that comes from the Internet (instead of our brains). In fact, we seem to 
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experience accessing knowledge through online search as if were accessing it within 
ourselves. Studies pointing to this direction found that participants who used Google to 
confirm answers to trivia questions (vs. thought of the answer without any external aid) 
made more optimistic predictions of their capacity to answer a completely new set of 
trivia questions without using Google, as if they simply knew answers to that kind of 
question (Ward, 2013b). Ostensibly, when we use tools like Google, our minds fail to 
accurately distinguish the new information found online from things we already know. 
There are a number of interconnected factors that potentially explain why this 
might happen. One such factor is our intense use of devices that allow us to search the 
Internet at will. Similar to how a person who automatically puts the same hat on the 
head when wakes up and wears it all the time has a self-extension relationship with that 
hat, most of us have become so connected to the Internet and to devices that allow us to 
go (or stay) online that they just feel like part of who we are. 
Another factor relates to how our minds process information about external 
sources. In typical forms of transactive memory, the divides between internally- and 
externally-stored information are made clear by detectible cues of the external source 
that help us keep track of the exogenous nature of new information. Sometimes, a 
physical component serves as one such cue: the shape of an object or the body of a 
person can be recognized as a tangible representation of the external source. In the case 
of human memory partners and oral sharing of knowledge, the voice of the other person 
can also help clarify where the information is coming from. In other cases, information 
might be retrieved from an object that requires actions such as moving to its location 
and spending time and energy to use it. The efforts to find the desired information serve 
as reminders that this information could not be retrieved from internal memory. 
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Internet search seems to make the cues of the presence of the external source less 
explicit. The physical component associated with access to information online (e.g., the 
laptop, the tablet, the smartphone) is usually one we can associate with our internal 
memory just as much as with external sources. We offload into computers, tablets, and 
smartphones things that are the product of our own thoughts and that we indeed 
remembered (as when we write something for school or work, prepare an email, or 
communicate with friends). Online searching often leads to written information, so there 
are no voice cues that help highlight its exogenous nature. The physical efforts to reach 
these devices are considerably reduced as well, since we increasingly tend to have 
computers and tablets close at hand and smartphones in our pockets. 
A third factor is the influence of the speed and the ease with which information can 
be retrieved online. Because Google is extremely fast and simple to operate, it reveals 
the target information faster than the mind can process the cues mentioned above and 
searches in our own memory can reveal whether the information is stored internally or 
not. This idea has been explored in contexts of general knowledge by comparing 
cognitive self-esteem of participants who used a normal version of Google to access 
trivia knowledge with participants who used a slow version of Google (that took longer 
to show the results) and participants who did not use any search tool (Ward, 2013b). 
Only the normal version of Google inflated cognitive self-esteem. Thus, the absence or 
presence of certain facts in internal memory can be recognized even when they are 
being verified through Internet search, as long the processing of cues of the external 
source and internal search can be completed, making us aware of our knowledge of the 
the target facts (or lack thereof). 
All these forces related to online search obfuscate the divides between our human 
mind and the “hive mind” that the Internet has become (Sparrow & Chatman, 2013). Is 
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it the Internet that can provide answers that fast or is it me? Is this particular piece of 
information stored in the “cloud” or was it in my head all along? Could I have come up 
this answer or can it only be formulated by an expert and given to me by Google? (As 
Studies 2 and 3 suggest) these are the kinds of question that we are NOT asking 
ourselves. Instead, because our minds are not proficient in keeping track of what we are 
learning from Google and what we already know, we misattribute knowledge from the 
Internet to ourselves. As this misattribution occurs, it follows that Internet search makes 
us feel as if new information was something we actually knew all along and it simply 
was not on the top of our head when we first thought of the question that led us to 
search online in the first place. 
Initial studies exploring miscalibration driven by the Internet have shown that after 
accessing trivia facts using an online search tool, participants became overconfident in 
their knowledge of other trivia facts (Ward, 2013b). Theoretically, a key factor behind 
this overconfidence should be the misguided sensation of familiarity with new 
information revealed by Google that arises from knowledge misattribution. The first 
series of studies presented here (in particular, Studies 2 and 3) explored how this feeling 
of already knowing new information builds extra confidence in decision-making 
abilities. 
Conceptually, the question of whether Internet-induced miscalibration can affect 
decision tasks does not have a clear answer. On the one hand, a decision task might 
resemble answering factual questions in the sense that analogously to the right answer, 
there is a supposedly best option (i.e., the “right choice”). From this point of view, one 
might expect the findings from the trivia knowledge experiments mentioned above to 
plainly transfer to decision contexts. However, some distinctive aspects of decision 
tasks bring this expectation into question. 
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One such aspect is the fact that personal decisions have consequences with which 
the individual has to deal after the decision was made. This forward-looking perspective 
imposed by tasks involving personal decisions might motivate people to engage in the 
reviewing of the criteria and the rationale of the decision process. In turn, the internal 
revisions of the decision process might illuminate people’s actual aptitude to make the 
decision. 
In addition to this – and particularly relevant to the present research –, not all 
decision contexts involve an objectively superior alternative (i.e., an objectively “right 
choice”). As it will be discussed in greater detail later, experiential choices entail 
subjective outcomes that can be influenced by numerous factors and cannot be argued to 
be universally and factually better or worse. 
In this sense, selecting among experiences is substantially different from identifying 
the factual truth, as in trivia knowledge tests. Instead, the context of experiential choices 
might hold a closer resemblance to a study where the factual knowledge test was 
replaced with an autobiographical knowledge assessment (e.g., “How is your town 
different from other parts of the country?,” “What is the relationship between the classes 
you chose during freshman year of high school and your current career?” – Fisher et al., 
2015 – Experiment 3). Similar to the outcomes of experiential choices, the answers to 
these questions are personal, cannot be factually checked online, and can be largely a 
matter of perception. They might vary according to a number of factors and even 
change through time, and they still can be considered the “right answer.” Participants of 
this study completed an Internet search task involving explanatory answers to factual 
questions that miscalibrated self-assessed abilities to provide new factual explanations 
in other studies, but there were no Google effects on self-perceived capacity to answer 
the autobiographical questions. 
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In sum, the consequential and subjective nature of the outcomes of experiential 
choices make decision-making contexts (involving experiences) substantially different 
from the general knowledge settings in which Google-induced miscalibration has been 
observed in the past. So what is behind the hypothesis that Internet search inflates 
confidence in decision skills? 
The basic idea is that the feeling of already knowing facts that pertain to a given 
domain where people make personal decisions (e.g., financial investments, travel and 
tourism, movies) increases subjective knowledge in that domain (Alba & Hutchinson, 
1987; 2000). This happens because knowledge self-assessment involves a process that 
can be tricked by illusions of knowledge.  Knowledge assessments rely on judgment 
cues of topical (and not necessarily objectively verifiable) information stored in internal 
memory and prior experiences in the domain of the decision (Park, Mothersbaugh, & 
Feick, 1994). The feeling of already knowing new information triggered by Internet 
search might delude the metacognitve evaluation into overestimating the presence of 
relevant information in internal memory and relax internal search during the formation 
of the assessment. Potentially, Google contributes to the maintenance of this illusion by 
also cueing easy retrievability of information (e.g., Bhargave et al., 2016). The illusory 
feeling that new knowledge is old knowledge also implies a sense of familiarity that can 
misinform the scanning for cues of prior experience. This might be a particularly easy 
misconception to be formed to the extent that the decision domain is one in which the 
individual is likely to have some prior experiences. Thus, completely unfamiliar 
contexts could impose a boundary to Google-induced inflation of subjective knowledge. 
High subjective knowledge leads to greater reliance on one’s own judgments about 
the options in a consideration-set (Raju, Lonial, & Mangold, 1995). To the extent that 
people are under the influence of a boosted sense of mastery because of stimuli such as 
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Internet search, they feel more capable of telling good from bad among choice 
alternatives and trust their own judgments more, as if they were expert decision makers. 
Because people are naturally bad at recognizing incomplete knowledge in their own 
internal structures (Collins, Warrock, Aiello, & Miller, 1975), the actual amount of 
knowledge stored in memory that is relevant to form judgments about their choice 
alternatives tends not to be stressed during the decision process (otherwise, the process 
could shed light on knowledge gaps and reduce miscalibration). Instead, the (sometimes 
limited) knowledge that is accessed during this process is likely to be regarded as 
complete and of high quality. 
In conclusion, although there are substantial differences between decision contexts 
(especially those involving personal experience options) and previous settings where 
metacognitive errors produced by Internet search were observed, because knowledge 
misattribution – ergo, Google-induced feelings of already knowing new information – is 
a key driving force of these errors, they should be reflected in self-perceived decision 
abilities as well. On the next sections, three experiments exploring how using Google 
affects confidence in decision-making abilities are described. Following this series of 
experiments, it will be argued (in “RESEARCH BACKGROUND II: THE SELF-
FULFILLING PROPHECY OF GOOGLE-INDUCED DECISION CONFIDENCE”) 
that the “virtual confidence” elicited by Google has a self-fulfilling influence on the 
experiences people have with the outcomes of their choices. The last series of 
experiments will address this hypothesis. 





OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
 
The phenomenon of changes in subjective experiences induced by simply searching 
for facts on the Internet arises through a chain of effects that begins with the conflation 
of knowledge accessed through Google with internal knowledge (as outlined in the 
previous section) and culminates in expectations adultered by miscalibrated confidence 
spilling over into subjective experiences. To better understand this process, two sets of 
experiments were conducted, each focusing on a different part of the chain. 
The first set of experiments (presented next) dissected the process through which 
Internet search inflates confidence in decision skills. These studies used the context of 
travel and tourism – i.e., participants searched the Internet for travel-related facts (vs. 
accessed them through other means) and considered travel-related decisions while 
assessing their skills. The choice of this context (as well as the context used in the 
second set of experiments, movies) took into account the possibility that decision tasks 
involving unfamiliar domains might restrain distortions in knowledge assessment. Even 
though many participants might have never traveled abroad, they are likely to have 
some experience traveling to new places and the concept of visiting another country 
should not sound outlandish. 
The first experiment focused on establishing that accessing information through 
online search affects some dimensions of consumer self-confidence, in particular 
consumers’ perceptions of their consideration-set formation abilities, but does not 
increase confidence to do things that are less knowledge-based (e.g., making demands 
to agents in the marketplace). The second and the third experiments both explored the 
role of the “feeling of already knowing” as a driver of Google-induced extra confidence 
in decision abilities. In doing so, the second study tested if this driver is unique to the 
use of tools like Google and not just to search efforts (i.e., with or without Google). 
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Between the first (Studies 1-3) and the second set of experiments (Studies 4 and 5) – 
which focused on the second leg of the chain of effects –, another conceptual section is 
presented, building on the findings of the first set of studies and preparing the ground 
for the subsequent experiments. To investigate Google effects on subjective 
experiences, it was necessary to incorporate some content to be experienced by 
participants as part of the experiments. Because it was not possible to provide a travel 
experience to all participants, a more affordable consumer context was adopted. Studies 
4 and 5 induced confidence in decision abilities through the search for facts and 
concepts related to movies and provided participants with the opportunity to watch a 
short animated film during the experimental session. Similar to traveling abroad, 
animated films is a domain that should not be strange and unfamiliar to most people. 
Study 4 focused on illuminating the roles of the belief in choice superiority and 
inferences about choice outcomes on how Internet search affects experience enjoyment. 
Study 5 attempted to replicate Study 4 and show what happens when people under the 
influence of Google experience content that they did not have the opportunity to choose 
(and was randomly selected for them).  
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STUDY 1: GOOGLE BOOSTS CONSUMER SELF-CONFIDENCE 
 
As a starting point for the empirical examination of Google-induced overconfidence 
in decision skills, Study 1 used an already validated instrument to measure consumer 
self-confidence. This instrument was adapted from Bearden et al., (2001), who 
conceptualized consumer self-confidence as “the extent to which the individual feels 
capable and assured with respect to his or her marketplace decisions and behaviors.” (p. 
122). In their model, consumer self-confidence involves six dimensions. Four of them 
explicitly pertain to the decision-making process. The other two reflect self-protection 
skills that are relevant in consumer settings. 
The four decision-related dimensions of consumer self-confidence are (1) 
acquisition of information, (2) consideration-set formation, (3) personal outcomes, and 
(4) social outcomes. Acquisition of information reflects consumers’ confidence in their 
capacity to obtain relevant information to support decision-making. Consideration-set 
formation skills are abilities to identify the best options in a set of alternatives available. 
The personal outcomes dimension reflects one’s confidence that her/his choices in the 
marketplace will produce personally gratifying outcomes. The social outcomes 
dimension reflects expectations about the reactions of others to the one’s decisions as a 
consumer. 
The two self-protection-related dimensions of the model are (5) persuasion 
knowledge and (6) marketplace interfaces. The former involves skills that help avoid 
the pitfalls of becoming a victim of manipulative behavior by market agents. The latter 
refers to skills that help express relevant thoughts and take actions in interactions with 
agents in market environments. 
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Examining self-confidence as a multidimensional construct allows exploring the 
breath of Google effects on confidence and understand the boundaries of the influence 
of Internet search within its conceptual domain. Anticipating that the impact of the 
Google stimulus will not be widespread across consumer self-confidence, three 
dimensions are of special interest in this study: acquisition of information, 
consideration-set formation, and personal outcomes. 
Bearden et al.’s acquisition of information measure essentially tailors transactive 
memory skills – the ability to find and access external knowledge – to consumer 
decision contexts. It should, therefore, mirror results found in previous research that 
examined how Internet search affects perceived transactive memory skills. Specifically, 
in the context of general knowledge, studies have found that searching the Internet 
increased people’s self-esteem with respect to such skills (Ward, 2013b). Worth 
pointing out, the procedure of the experimental manipulation in these previous studies 
was substantially different from the procedure of the current experiment in two aspects 
(besides its focus on consumer decision contexts instead of general knowledge). First, 
the current study equalizes exposure to information across experimental conditions (the 
one that involves Google search vs. the one that does not), changing only how 
information is accessed by participants in each condition, whereas the previous studies 
that unveiled altered perceived transactive memory skills due to the use Google 
compared online search to internal memory search. Thus, for half the participants (the 
internal search condition), exposure to information was idiosyncratic and depended on 
what answers each one of them could remember. Second, the current study exposes 
participants to information in the form of articles that explain a certain topic, whereas 
previous Google effects on transactive memory perceptions were shown in studies 
where the information presented (or asked) to participants consisted in a straightforward 
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answer (i.e., a specific fact that could presented as a short-term or a number). 
Replicating the Google effect on perceptions of transactive memory skills (herein 
observed in the form of perceived abilities to acquire information in consumer contexts) 
despite these procedural differences validates the current approach as a method to 
investigate other Google-induced distortions in self-assessed cognitive skills – such as 
skills to identify superior options among a number of alternatives (Studies 1, 2 and 3) –, 
mechanistic factors behind these distortions – such as the feeling of already knowing 
information found online (Studies 2 and 3) –, and their downstream consequences – 
including inflated choice confidence, positive choice evaluations and expectations, and 
enhancement of subjective experiences (Studies 4 and 5).  
The special interest in the other two dimensions, perceptions of consideration-set 
formation skills and personal outcomes, does not involve these methodological nature 
and validation benefits. These dimensions of consumer-self confidence are highlighted 
here because, of the six dimensions, these are the ones most closely connected to the 
hypothesis of the inflation of confidence in decision abilities at a conceptual level. 
The effect of Internet search on perceived consideration-set formation skills is 
particularly relevant because it suggests that Google makes people feel better qualified 
to examine and evaluate the options they can choose from in personal decision settings. 
An effect of Internet search on assessments of personal outcomes of personal decisions 
implies that Google makes people more self-assured of their choices, precluding the 
downstream consequences of inflated confidence in decision skills that are explored 
later in this research (regarding how choices are assessed and experienced). 
Google effects on perceived social outcomes of decisions, self-assessed persuasion 
knowledge, and abilities that are relevant in market interfaces suggest that online search 
can produce a more generalized positive sense of one’s capacity to navigate through 
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consumer contexts successfully. However, the idea that online search engenders 
metacognitive errors due to the conflation of the performance of the search engine and 
one’s own cognitive knowledge and capacity to remember facts and formulate 
responses does not accommodate the prediction that these other dimensions can be 
miscalibrated by Internet search. If the conflation of knowledge and the consequent 
feeling of already knowing online information are the fundamental driving forces of 
Google-induced confidence inflation, the dimensions of confidence that are subject to 
the effect must be tied to the use of descriptive knowledge (Fisher et al., 2015) and 
cognitive skills that compete with the Internet (Ward, 2013b). Basically, the Internet is 
expected to inflate confidence to execute rather knowledge-based tasks. 
The social outcomes dimension of consumer self-confidence involves less reliance 
on one’s own cognitive skills and more on the behavior of others. The dimensions of 
persuasion knowledge and marketing interfaces not only involve a greater reliance on 
the behavior of others as well but also add social skills perceptions and, particularly in 
the case of the latter, elements of self-determination to the set factors influencing 
confident behavior. In essence, to the extent that an action (e.g., impress others, deal 
with persuasion agents, speak up to ensure appropriate services) capitalizes more on 
external factors (e.g., others’ reactions) and other kinds of skills (e.g., social skills), it is 
rather unlikely that online search will exert some systematic influence on confidence to 
execute this action. 
Lastly, it also worth pointing out that using Bearden et al.’s instrument to assess the 
influence of online search on self-confidence provides a conservative test for Google-
induced overconfidence. This instrument stimulates the respondent to think about their 
global experience as a consumer and, thus, measures global self-assessments of skills 
that are relevant in consumer contexts, and not perceptions of situational outcomes of 
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the use of such skills. Thinking globally might wash away Google-induced 
overconfidence because of other cues, related to past experiences, being retrieved from 




Participants and design 
Participants (N = 151) were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to participate 
in a study on Qualtrics. The experiment followed a single-factor design with two levels: 
no search vs. online search. 
 
Procedure 
Study 1 involved two phases. Phase 1 was an information exposure, or learning, 
section. This phase was used to induce the Google effect. In Phase 2, the outcome 
measures were collected. Both phases are described in greater detail below. 
Phase 1. Participants were told they would first learn about selected travel-related 
topics on the pretext that reading about these topics would aid them in a challenge later 
in the study. They were randomly assigned to a search condition before being presented 
with these topics. All participants had access to the same information, but how they 
accessed the information was conditioned on their experimental group. 
Five topics that resemble information people search online while preparing to 
travel to another country (e.g., “How to avoid credit card and ATM fees while traveling 
abroad?”) were used in the experimental manipulation. All topics were framed as 
questions. All topics of this and the other studies are available and pretest information 
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are provided in Appendix A. Throughout Phase 1, participants were exposed to a total 
of three topics that were randomly selected for them. 
Topics were randomly presented one at a time (i.e., one per page). For each topic, 
participants in the no search condition received a related article to read on their 
computer screens. Participants in the online search condition were provided with 
instructions to search online for a specific website and read the information about the 
topic on the webpage (see Appendix B for the webpage of each topic). To make sure 
participants performed the search, they were required to copy the URL of each page 
they visited and paste it on a specific space on the page of the study. Searching the 
websites on Google would lead to pages where participants would find the same articles 
provided to the no search group. Topics and their respective articles were selected so 
that the target pages would appear among the top links of the results from Google when 
the exact questions presented as topics were typed into the search box. To avoid an 
uneven influence of knowledge of the source and website credibility, participants in the 
no search group were informed of the website that served as the source of each text they 
read. 
Phase 2. After learning about three topics, participants advanced to Phase 2. In this 
section, they completed a questionnaire with items from Bearden et al.’s consumer self-
confidence scale. The order of items was randomized. Lastly, participants completed a 
series of personal questions and were thanked and debriefed. 
 
Measures 
Items from Bearden et al.’s (2001) consumer self-confidence measure were 
reworded to adapt to the context of tourism and travel. All items are available in 
Appendix C, along with the respective reliability coefficients. Responses were recorded 
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on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = Strongly agree to 7 = Strongly disagree. For the 
analyses, items in each dimension were averaged into a single score of the respective 





Figure 1 shows group means and standard errors across all dimensions of Bearden et 
al.’s consumer self-confidence model and the overall construct of consumer self-
confidence (CSC). Table 1 details these results providing the tests for differences across 
search conditions and respective effect sizes. 
The analysis revealed a significant difference in self-assessed acquisition of 
information skills (AI). Based on what was outlined above, this result mirrors previous 
findings in the context of general knowledge where online search inflated people’s 
estimations of their own transactive memory abilities (Ward, 2013b). 
Results also showed that after accessing travel-related information through online 
search, participants made more positive assessments of their consideration-set formation 
capacity (CSF). As aforementioned, this dimension of self-confidence maps directly to 
decision skills. Therefore, this result supports my central thesis that Google-induced 
distortions of self-perceived cognitive skills include perceived abilities to make personal 
decisions. 
Surprisingly, no influence of online search was observed when examining the third 
dimension of consumer self-confidence that was highlighted in the introduction of this 
study, perceived personal outcomes of one’s own decisions (PO). 
Overall, results did not reveal significant effects of accessing information through 
online search when other dimensions of consumer self-confidence were examined (see 
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Table 1). There was, however, the unexpected exception of a marginally significant 




Figure 1. Means and ± SEM of each dimension and the overarching construct of 
consumer self-confidence across search conditions. AI = acquisition of information; 
CSF = consideration-set formation; PO = personal outcomes; SO = social outcomes; PK 






Table 1. Means and standard deviations of each dimension and the overarching 
construct of consumer self-confidence across search conditions, tests of mean-
differences, and effect sizes. 
Dimension No Search Online Search Test Cohen's d 
AI 
M = 5.31, 
SD = 1.05 
M = 5.68, 
SD = 0.88 
t(149) = 2.26, p =.025, 
95% CI = [0.05, 0.91] 0.38 
CSF 
M = 5.09, 
SD = 1.06 
M = 5.52, 
SD = 0.81 
t(149) = 2.62, p =.010, 
95% CI = [0.11, 0.75] 0.45 
PO 
M = 5.09, 
SD = 1.16 
M = 5.03, 
SD = 1.28 
t(149) = 0.32, p =.753, 
95% CI = [-0.34, 0.47] 0.05 
SO 
M = 3.99, 
SD = 1.37 
M = 4.01, 
SD = 1.56 
t(149) = 0.08, p =.93, 
95% CI = [-0.50, 0.46] 0.01 
PK 
M = 5.15, 
SD = 1.08 
M = 5.46, 
SD = 0.83 
t(149) = 1.83, p =.069, 
95% CI = [-0.02, 0.64] 0.32 
MI 
M = 4.54, 
SD = 1.51 
M = 4.66, 
SD = 1.70 
t(149) = 0.46, p =.650, 
95% CI = [-0.41, 0.65] 0.07 
CSC 
M = 4.94, 
SD = 0.89 
M = 4.66, 
SD = 0.88 
t(149) = 1.51, p =.133, 
95% CI = [-0.06, 0.49] 0.26 
Note: AI = acquisition of information; CSF = consideration-set formation; PO = 
personal outcomes; SO = social outcomes; PK = persuasion knowledge; MI = market 




Study 1 makes three important contributions. First, it validates the procedural 
approach of the experimental manipulation. Despite substantial differences in the 
information exposure procedure used in Study 1 relative to the procedure used in 
previous research and the fact that Study 1 focused on a consumer context (using a 
measure tailored for this context), the experiment replicated effects of online search on 
self-assessments of transactive memory abilities. This replication support that the 
materials employed as experimental stimuli in Study 1 produce the same class of effects 
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on metacognition revealed through the general knowledge studies that showed distorted 
self-assessments of cognitive skills in the past. 
Second, Study 1 suggests that Google effects are limited to specific dimensions of 
consumer self-confidence. In particular, Internet search did not influence the dimensions 
of social outcomes and market interfaces. This was an expected result because these 
dimensions involve proportionally less knowledge-based skills and rely more on 
reactions of others (social outcomes) and on a combination of social skills and self-
determination (market interfaces). Unexpectedly, there was a positive effect of Internet 
search on participants’ perceptions of their persuasion knowledge. This effect was not 
hypothesized, but it is possible that, to the extent that people feel more confident in their 
decision-making skills, they feel more immune to the influence of persuasive agents on 
their decision processes and more capable of protecting themselves against manipulative 
attempts. 
The third contribution is the evidence that confidence in decision-making abilities 
is one of the affected dimensions, as observed in the effect of online search on 
consideration-set formation skills. This finding serves as a foundation to the remainder 
of the studies in this research. 
It was expected that the influence of the Internet on decision confidence would be 
further observed in the effect of online search on participants’ perceptions of the 
personal outcomes of their decisions. However, this effect was not observed in my 
results. It is possible that the test failed to capture an effect due to the framing of the 
items used to measure this dimension. As discussed in the introduction of this study, all 
items used to measure the outcome variables require, to some extent, global assessments 
from the respondent. However, one could make a stronger case for this particular 
dimension compared to the other highlighted dimensions of the model (namely, 
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acquisition of information and consideration-set formation skills). Specifically, the 
items measuring the other dimensions are more easily interpreted as statements about 
one’s current state – e.g., “I know where to find…” (from the acquisition of information 
dimension) and “I am confident about…” (from the consideration-set formation 
dimension) are more easily interpreted as “Right now, I know where to find…” and “I 
am feeling confident about…”, respectively. In turn, the items used to measure the 
dimension of personal outcomes perceptions all include adverbs that explicitly stimulate 
the respondent to think globally (e.g., “often”). This feature of this dimension of 
consumer self-confidence might have impinged on the capacity of the study to 
demonstrate increases in people’s self-assurance with respect to personal outcomes of 
their choices because such confidence might be only reflected as a current state. Studies 
4 and 5 provide a better test to address the influence of the Internet on confidence in 




STUDY 2: GOOGLE-INDUCED KNOWLEDGE MISATTRIBUTION DRIVES 
CONFIDENCE  
 
Study 2 was designed with three purposes. First, it aimed to examine Google-
induced confidence in decision skills by having participants forecasting their 
performance in a subsequent decision task. Engaging in thinking of a specific upcoming 
decision task is a less conservative approach compared to the consumer self-confidence 
instrument used in Study 1, but most likely better represents how Google effects on 
confidence play out in daily contexts. Moreover, this approach should reduce the noise 
from previous decision experiences that might have factored into self-assessments in 
Study 1. 
The second purpose was to rule out pure search effects and highlight the role of the 
search engine in Google-induced confidence. An important limitation of Study 1 and 
previous investigations of Google effects on self-assessed cognitive skills is that online 
search was either compared to no search (e.g. Fisher et al., 2015, 2018; Ward et al., 
2018) or internal search (Ward, 2013b). Because of this, one could argue that these 
studies show consequences of searching for information, but do not disentangle the 
effect of performing the search from the effect of using an online search engine to do so. 
To address pure search effects, a manual search condition, where participants would 
engage in information search without Google or any other online search engine, was 
included in the experimental design. 
The third purpose was to explore the role of the feeling of already knoweing the 
stems from knowledge misattribution. The knowledge misattribution hypothesis 
suggests that Internet search can (almost) uniquely produce this feeling, which acts as a 
mediating factor boosting confidence in decision-making (and other cognitive) skills. 
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With this hypothesis in mind, Study 2 was designed to allow a mediation analysis 
(Hayes, 2013) where the feeling of already knowing new information is modeled as a 




Participants and design 
Undergraduate students (N = 121) participated in the experiment as part of a series 
of computer-based studies conducted in a behavioral laboratory at McCombs School of 
Business (University of Texas at Austin) in exchange for course credits. The design of 




Study 2 had the same two-phase structure as Study 1. However, the materials used 
in each phase were modified. 
Phase 1. The presentation of the task was similar to Study 1. Before receiving the 
topics that should be learned during Phase 1, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the three search conditions. All participants received five random travel-related 
topics, one per page. These were not the same topics used in Study 1. The five topics to 
which participants were exposed in this experimental induction were selected from a 
pool containing ten topics used only in Study 2 (see Appendix A). An important feature 
of these topics is that, when typed into the search box, Google would provide a quick 
answer, or a featured snippet, in the “Answer Box” on the top of the results page (see 
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Figure 2 for an example). Thus, instead of reading full articles, all participants of Study 
2 read quick answers from Google. 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of the “Answer Box” on Google’s results page when one of the 
topics of the stimulus was used as the search term. 
 
In the no search condition, along with each topic, participants received the 
respective quick answer (extracted from Google) on the page of the study and did not 
have to carry out any information search. In the manual search condition, participants 
received the same answer on their computer screens, but each answer was provided 
along with 19 other travel-related Google snippets that were irrelevant to the specific 
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topic of the page – these snippets were extracted from results of Google searches using 
other travel-related topics. Each piece of information on the page was numbered from 1 
to 20. The topic would appear on the top of the screen, followed by instructions to scroll 
through the page to find the relevant information. These instructions contained the 
number of the target answer (always above 10 to ensure that the answer would not be on 
the top of the page because such location would release participants from carrying out 
the manual search). The purpose of specifying the number of the target piece of 
information was to avoid uncertainty of the answer and search fatigue due to effortful 
examination of all the information on the page while attempting to identify the relevant 
piece. In the online search condition, along with each topic, participants received 
instructions to find the relevant information online and a link that would open Google 
on a new window. Specifically, instructions said that reading the information in the 
“Answer Box” was sufficient for the study. Thus, as in the manual search condition, 
uncertainty of the answer and the process of examining several pieces of information 
during the search process was avoided. Moreover, these cautions concerning both 
search conditions approximate the information search experience of participants in 
these conditions to the experience of participants in the no search condition, who would 
not deal with answer uncertainty or invest effort in information search because their task 
involved only passively receiving the relevant information on the computer screen. 
Phase 2. After completing Phase 1, participants advanced to Phase 2, described as 
a quiz section. Participants completed the measures of confidence in decision-making 
abilities and knowledge misattribution in anticipation of the quiz. Then it was revealed 
that there was no actual quiz and participants completed a final set of personal questions 





To assess knowledge misattribution, participants reported their feeling of already 
knowing the material they read during Phase 1. Specifically, participants expressed the 
extent to which they agreed with the following statement, “I feel like I already knew 
much of what the topics in the learning section said, although I wouldn't necessarily 
remember details right away” (7-point scale, 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). 
The measure of confidence in decision-making abilities focused on participants’ 
assessments of their capacity to identify the superior option in a set of similar 
alternatives. In the beginning of Phase 2, participants were told that this part of the 
study consisted in a travel-related quiz. In the description of the quiz, they read the 
following prompt: 
 
In one section of the quiz, you will be presented with travel itineraries, all 
involving the same destinations. We surveyed people who have followed 
each itinerary and found that one of them is the best itinerary (people who 
followed that itinerary were more satisfied with the trip than people who 
followed any of the other itineraries). You will be asked to use your 
abilities to assess travel plans and choose one of the itineraries as if you 
would take the trip and follow it yourself. 
 
The prompt was followed by the question, “How likely do you think you will 
choose the best itinerary?” Responses were recorded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 






Results of an ANOVA suggested that participants’ feeling of already knowing the 
information presented during Phase 1 was significantly different across conditions, F(2, 
118) = 3.12, p = .048, ƞ2 = .05. Planned comparisons suggested that levels of knowledge 
misattribution were higher in the online search group (M = 4.40, SD = 1.51) compared 
to the other conditions, t(118) = 2.07, p = .040. Results indicated no statistically 
significant differences in knowledge misattribution between the no search group (M = 
4.00, SD = 1.51) and the manual search group (M = 3.56, SD = 1.51), t(118) = 1.38, p = 
.171. Results are represented in Figure 3. 
Challenging expectations, an ANOVA examining the effect of the experimental 
condition on confidence did not reveal significant results, F(2, 118) = 0.09, p = .91. 
Based on Figure 4, it can be inferred that the null result is not due to lack of statistical 
power of the study because the levels of confidence across groups did not trend towards 
the expected direction (i.e., higher levels in the online search group). A possible 
explanation then is that there were different sources of confidence across groups. The no 
search group experienced the “friendliest” task during Phase 1 compared to the other 
groups, as they passively received precise information in the simple format of a short 
answer. It is possible that this “friendly” experience led the no search group to 
singularly form the expectation of a “friendly” task during Phase 2, elevating their 
confidence in doing anything that would be required of them. In turn, the manual search 
group was exposed to more travel-related information than the other groups because 
they scrolled through the page while searching the relevant information. Numbering all 
pieces of information on the page and providing the number of the relevant piece were 
efforts employed in an attempt to diminish exposition to additional information. 
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However, given that the extra, irrelevant information was formatted as quick answers 
too, it is possible that participants processed a considerable amount of it in addition to 
the target information. In this case, having learned more during the first phase of the 
experiment could have matched their confidence regarding the tasks of the second phase 
with that of the other groups. Another explanation is that the manual search task 
stimulated greater attention while processing new information and this extra attention 
improved their encoding of new information during Phase 1. In this case, their 
confidence matched with the other groups not due to having learned more, but to having 
learned better. 
 
Figure 3. Means and ± SEM of the feeling of already knowing (knowledge 






Figure 4. Means and ± SEM of confidence (in decision-making abilities) across 
search conditions in Study 2. 
 
The speculative explanations outlined above exemplify how different factors, 
particular to each experimental condition, might have contributed to equalize levels of 
confidence across groups. Alas, these explanations are not testable here. However, the 
theoretical account of Google effects on decision confidence proposes knowledge 
misattribution as a distinctive mechanistic factor of Google-induced boosts in 
confidence. Thus, the online search group is the only experimental group that should 
have their levels of confidence driven, at least in part, by the feeling of already 
knowing. According to this premise, examining the mediating role of knowledge 
misattribution in the relationship between the experimental conditions and participants’ 
confidence (Figure 5) should help disentangle Google-induced confidence from 





Figure 5. Mediation model used to examine the role of the feeling of already knowing 
(knowledge misattribution) in Google-induced overconfidence in decision skills in 
Studies 22 and 3. 
 
Results of the path analysis of the mediation model are shown in Table 2. 
Supporting the hypothesis that confidence levels in the online search group were a 
consequence of knowledge misattribution, the mediation analysis revealed a significant 
indirect effect of Internet search on confidence mediated by participants’ feeling of 
already knowing, b = 0.18, BCa bootstrap 95% CI with 10,000 samples= [0.02, 0.40]. 
 
Table 2. Results of the path analysis in Study 2: unstandardized coefficients, standard 
errors, test statistics, and Pearson correlations. 
Path b SE Test r 
a 0.61 0.29 95% CI = [0.03, 1.19], t(119) = 2.08, p = .040 .19 
b 0.29 0.08 95% CI = [0.14, 0.44], t(118) = 3.83, p < .001 .33 
c' -0.27 0.25 95% CI = [-0.76, 0.22], t(118) = 1.08, p = .284 -.10 
Note: Based on the mediation model in Figure 5. 
 
  
                                                          
2 In the coding of the search condition, no search and manual search are comprised in the no online 






Evidence from Study 2 supports the idea that accessing new information through 
Google creates the sensation that the information found online is not new, but 
something that was stored in internal memory all along – i.e., people misattribute 
external knowledge (from the Internet) to themselves. Results suggested that this 
knowledge misattribution is not a general feature of information search, but rather a 
particular consequence of using an online search tool. Even though confidence in 
decision skills was the same across the three search conditions, levels of confidence in 
the online search group outstandingly stemmed from this misattribution. 
Study 2 successfully illuminated the process through which online search 
influences confidence in decision abilities, but was unsuccessful in the attempt to single 
out inflated confidence due Internet search. I speculate that uncontrolled factors related 
to the no search and the manual search conditions equalized confidence across all 
experimental conditions. Study 3 attempts to disentangle Google-induced boosts in 
confidence using the experiment procedure adopted in Study 1 and provide additional 





STUDY 3: GOOGLE-INDUCED KNOWLEDGE MISATTRIBUTION 
INFLATES CONFIDENCE 
 
Study 3 combined the materials used to manipulate access to information in Study 
1 with the measures of knowledge misattribution and confidence used in Study 2. One 
of the purposes of this study was to provide further support to the mechanistic process 
unveiled in Study 2. It is possible that exposing participants to information in the form 
of quick answers contributed to effects on knowledge misattribution because of the 
simplistic format in which answers were presented. It is easier to formulate simplistic 
than deeper, detailed answers, so it may be easier to misattribute information in the 
form of a snippet to one’s own knowledge than information in the form a more detailed 
text. When people read full articles instead of quick answers, the complexity involved in 
and the effort demanded when processing the information might shed light on the divide 
between internal and external knowledge. If this happens, the use of full articles for the 
information exposure procedure of Study 3 should not be successful in finding evidence 
of the mediating role of knowledge misattribution. On the other hand, empirical support 
for the mediation using full articles attests to the resilience of the mechanism to the 
format of the information. 
Another plausible perspective is that, in Study 2, the quick answer format 
facilitated knowledge misattribution among participants who did not search the Internet, 
diminishing the effect of online search. In this case, unless the full article format helps 
recognize online information and internally held information, exposing people to full 
articles should increase differences in knowledge misattribution between those who 
accessed them through Google and those who did not. 
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Another purpose of Study 3 was to bring out the inflated confidence of participants 
in the online search group. In Study 2, a possible driver of confidence in the no search 
group was inferred “friendliness” of tasks in Phase 2 due to participants’ experience 
with the learning task of Phase 1. Switching from information in the form of quick 
answers to information in the form of full articles should reduce tendencies to make 
such an inference because full articles are a more complex form of information 
presentation. 
No manual search condition was included in Study 2 for two reasons. First, 
although using full articles for the irrelevant information participants would have to deal 
with during the process of finding the target piece could help avoid the processing of 
additional information, it would increase the amount of content presented to the manual 
search group. This could overwhelm or stress participants and, consequently, lead to 
disengagement with the task. Second, if there is an “extra attention” benefit in manual 
search that improves information encoding, unless overwhelm or fatigue impinge on 
attention, manual search is most likely to always equalize levels of confidence. Unlike 
Google-induced confidence, this confidence is not illusory. However, testing this 
difference in confidence calibration requires an objective test of decision skills. This is 
doable in contexts where decisions have objectively assessable outcomes (e.g., financial 
decisions), but not in the context of personal experiential choices (e.g., places to travel). 
In addition to these considerations, Study 2 suggests not only that manual search 
does not lead to increases in confidence driven by knowledge misattribution, but also 
that knowledge misattribution after no search and after manual search are not 
statistically different. Considering that Study 3 focuses on the same mechanistic process 
as Study 2, there is no reason to expect that results at the process level (i.e., Figure 5) 
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would be different if a manual search condition was added to the design or replaced the 




Participants and design 
Participants (N = 143) were again recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and 
completed the study on Qualtrics. The experiment followed a single-factor design with 
two levels: no search vs. online search. 
 
Procedure and measures 
The same two-phase structure used in the previous studies was employed in Study 3. 
Phase 1. The learning phase of Study 3 used the same materials used for the 
experimental manipulation in Study 1. 
Phase 2. As in the previous study, participants were led to believe that the second 
part of the study consisted of a quiz. The same approach to measure knowledge 





Even though participants were exposed to information in a longer and more 
complete format than the format used in the experimental induction of Study 2, the 
results again provided evidence of knowledge misattribution. The online search group 
reported greater levels of the feeling of already knowing the information in Phase 1 (M 
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= 4.48, SD = 1.56) than the no search group (M = 3.73, SD = 1.70), t(141) = 2.64, 95% 
CI = [0.19, 1.31], p = .009,  d = 0.46. The difference between the experimental 




Figure 6. Means and ± SEM of the feeling of already knowing (knowledge 
misattribution) across search conditions in Study 3. 
 
In addition to differences in participants’ feeling of already knowing depending on 
the method of information access, the online search group was more confident in their 
capacity to select the superior travel itinerary (M = 5.19, SD = 1.05) than the no search 
group (M = 4.81, SD = 1.11), t(141) = 2.01, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.75], p = .046, d = 0.35 
(Figure 7). Thus, unlike the previous study, the current experiment successfully singled 
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out Google-induced inflation of confidence in decision-making abilities. Next, the 




Figure 7. Means and ± SEM of confidence (in decision-making abilities) across search 
conditions in Study 3. 
 
A mediation analysis was conducted to examine the contribution of Google-
induced knowledge misattribution to the levels of confidence among participants who 
accessed the travel-related information through online search. The model used for this 
analysis was the same mediation model used in Study 2 (Figure 5). Thus, results should 
(and did) replicate the mediation analysis conducted in the previous study. Table 3. 
Results of the path analysis in Study 3: unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, 
test statistics, and Pearson correlations. displays the results of the path analysis. 
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Supporting the proposed role of knowledge misattribution as a driver in the mechanistic 
process of Google-induced confidence in decision skills, results once more revealed that 
the feeling of already knowing information found on the Internet mediated the effect of 
online search on confidence in decision skills, b = 0.09, BCa bootstrap 95% CI with 
10,000 samples= [0.01, 0.26]. 
 
Table 3. Results of the path analysis in Study 3: unstandardized coefficients, standard 
errors, test statistics, and Pearson correlations. 
Path b SE Test r 
a 0.75 0.17 95% CI = [0.19, 1.31], t(141) = 2.64, p = .009 .22 
b 0.12 0.05 95% CI = [0.02, 0.23], t(141) = 2.28, p = .024 .19 
c' 0.28 0.19 95% CI = [-0.09, 0.66], t(141) = 1.50, p = .137 .13 




The current experiment shows that the knowledge misattribution phenomenon is 
not confined to the use of information in the form of quick answers and can arise even 
when people access full articles on websites, as long accessing these articles involves 
searching the Internet. As in the case of quick answers, the feeling of already knowing 
new information was shown to drive confidence in decision skills. Importantly, since 
the materials used to expose participants to new information in Study 3 avoided 
uncontrolled factors that, in the Study 2, could have equalized the confidence of the no 
search group with the confidence of the online search group, the current study 
successfully exposed that Internet search engenders inflated levels of confidence to 
perform the decision task. 
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This initial set of experiments (Studies 1-3) demonstrate that decision-making is 
one type of task that can be impacted by Google effects on metacognition. Decision 
skills include cognitive capacities (e.g., identifying superior options) that are distorted 
in people’s assessment of their own cognitive abilities. These distortions emerge 
because searching the Internet does not feel so much like accessing information from an 
external source as when the same information is explicitly provided to us by an external 
entity (e.g., the no search conditions) or accessing it requires the manual effort of going 
through information storage materials (as emulated by the manual search condition in 
Study 2). 
Alas, there are limitations to this initial set of studies and conceptual pieces need to 
be further explored for a more complete picture of the phenomenon of Google-induced 
overconfidence in decision abilities. Some of these limitations and pieces are outlined in 
the “GENERAL DISCUSSION” section and proposed as avenues for future research. 
Importantly, Studies 1-3 achieved the goal of empirically establishing that Internet 
search brings about metacognitive miscalibrations that change how we perceive our 
capacity to make personal decisions. With this foundation, the remainder of this 
research focuses on the demonstration of a downstream consequence of Google effects 




RESEARCH BACKGROUND II: THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY OF 
GOOGLE-INDUCED DECISION CONFIDENCE 
 
At an initial glance, the idea of Google-induced extra confidence in decision-making 
abilities might be worrisome. This concern could stem from the combination of two 
factors. First, the fact that, increasingly, our society incorporates the Internet and its 
search engines as seamless components of the daily life makes escaping from the 
influence of the Internet harder and costlier. It is true that not all Google search will lead 
to cognitive miscalibrations like inflated confidence in decision skills. For instance, 
when the question prompting the search is either extremely easy or extremely difficult 
to answer, Internet search does not increase cognitive self-esteem (Ward, 2013b). 
Similarly, recent experiments show that experts are less likely to become victims of 
Google-induced distorted perceptions of skills involved in making some kinds of 
decisions (Ward et al., 2018). However, considering how intensely tools like Google are 
relied upon, there are high chances that search queries that entail cognitive 
miscalibrations happen on a daily basis, as part of the mounting Internet searches that 
are processed every day. Basically, even though we do not suffer metacognitive 
distortions every single time we use Google, we use Google so much that it is likely that 
these distortions will arise at some point in any given day. 
Second, overconfidence carries with it a number of disadvantages and undesirable 
consequences. For instance, overconfidence has been associated with causes of wars 
(Johnson, 2004). Positive illusions of this kind have also been considered as one of the 
roots of recklessness in dealing with environmental problems because they entail 
misleading optimism with respect to chances to avoid or solve environmental 
degradation (Johnson & Levin, 2009). In the context of negotiations between managers 
and union representatives, there is evidence that overconfident managers display less 
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concessionary behavior and make less successful deals (Neale & Bazerman, 1985). 
Even major financial crises have been associated with the widespread overconfident 
behavior of key actors of the financial sector (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009). 
Previous research has also focused on contexts of personal decisions, often 
portraying overconfidence as a cognitive trap for decision makers (e.g., Hammond, 
Keeney, & Raiffa, 1998). Research on investor behavior provides concise arguments for 
this view: overconfident investors trade excessively but have reduced returns (Barber & 
Odean, 2001). Overconfidence has also been argued to be associated with gambling 
tendencies  (Lakey, Rose, Campbell, & Goodie, 2008) and excessive betting on one’s 
own performance (Campbell, Googie, & Foster, 2004). 
Along these lines, research conducted alongside the present research highlights 
behavioral consequences of Google-induced overconfidence in investing skills (Ward et 
al., 2018). In one study, after learning investing-related information – concepts that 
people could wish to learn while trying to educate themselves about the “world of 
investing” (e.g., “What is a ‘Bear Market’?”) – through Internet search (vs. no search), 
participants completed an investment task for which they could receive a monetary 
reward based on their performance. Just before the investment task, participants could 
balance how much of the reward would consist of a fixed value and how much would 
depend on their performance  (see Fox & Tversky, 1995). Right after completing the 
investment task (but before having any feedback of their performance), participants had 
the opportunity to change their bets. Results showed that the group that searched the 
Internet bet more on their performance but did not perform better. Moreover, carrying 
out the investment task did not recalibrate participants’ confidence in their investing 
skills (participants did not change their bets when the opportunity for it was given after 
the investment task). 
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In another experiment by the same authors, the investment task consisted in the 
simulation of a retirement plan (inspired on platforms like Betterment) where 
participants chose how to allocate an initial amount of $10,000.00 between bonds and 
stocks. The instructions for this simulation explicitly stated that allocating more money 
on bonds was considered a more conservative strategy whereas allocating more money 
on stocks was a more aggressive one (alluding to the concept that stocks are a riskier 
investment than bonds). Before making the allocation, participants received a 
recommendation from the system of the simulation suggesting how much they should 
invest in stocks based on their age. The recommendation included a range around the 
suggested percentage and explained that investing above (below) that range would be 
too aggressive (conservative) for them. The group that used Google to access investing-
related information before the simulation deviated more from the recommendation. 
Moreover, this deviation gravitated towards the limit of allocation on stocks above 
which their investment would be considered aggressive. Thus, Google-based financial 
learning not only hindered advice-taking but also motivated riskier investing behavior. 
Although there are worrying consequences, overconfidence must carry certain 
advantages with it that overshadow its costs. Otherwise, the evolution of the human 
species would have extinguished overconfidence a long time ago – instead of allowing 
it to become, to some extent, a default feature of human beings (e.g., Moore & Healy, 
2008). Previous research has shed some light on this puzzle and identified certain 
circumstances in which operating under the influence of positive illusions pays off. In 
particular, some areas that require people to cope with high uncertainty (e.g., 
international relations, novel technologies, untested allies) tend to reward overconfident 
behavior (Johnson & Fowler, 2011). 
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From an evolutionary perspective, another possible contribution of overconfidence 
might reside in the maintenance of a motivation to stay alive. In critical situations like 
life threats, overconfidence can motivate people to resist. In contexts that are not 
necessarily so critical, but (like Google) are perhaps more common in modern life, 
overconfidence might reward us with self-fulfilling prophecies that benefit our sense of 
accomplishment, well-being, and satisfaction with life. Studies 4 and 5 were built on 
this concept and showcase an instance of such prophecies. 
To dissertate on the self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis, it might be helpful to revisit 
the concept of overconfidence as a trap for decision makers. This concept stems from 
observations in settings in which the chosen option can be objectively verified to be 
superior or inferior to the dismissed alternatives – e.g., financial decisions. Monetary 
profits and losses from an investment, a gamble, or a negotiation are observable and 
directly measurable. Importantly, the outcomes of the options available in this kind of 
decision context are independent of the decision maker’s perceptions– e.g., a financial 
investment yields returns or losses regardless of how the investor feels about that 
particular investment. 
The objective verification of the outcome is not tangible for all kinds of choices – or 
at least not as much as in contexts like the ones mentioned above. The outcomes of 
experiential choices (e.g., watching a movie, traveling, listening to music, hedonic 
consumption of food) are certainly less sharply defined than the outcomes of financial 
investments. Curiously though, one might argue that the experiential, subjective 
outcomes of choices are much more prevalent than the objective, verifiable ones. After 
all, because even decision contexts that revolve around objective outcomes can be 
assessed on the merits of their experiential qualities (e.g., investing can be described and 
evaluated as an experience, instead of simply a means to increase wealth). 
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It is true that, just as people make financial decisions aiming for the best outcomes 
(i.e., higher profits), people make experiential choices with the aim of having the best 
experience. However, because experience superiority is not an objective assessment, 
one’s conclusion about her or his own experience is subject to the influence of 
numerous factors that are extrinsic to the features engineered into the experience itself. 
Many of these factors - including mood, personal values, and biased beliefs – are 
internal to the individual (even though they can be dictated by external forces) and 
change experiences through top-down processes. 
Lee, Frederick, and Ariely (2006) provide a good example of the influence of top-
down processing on experiences in their “MIT brew” studies. These studies involved 
tasting and evaluating two beers: a regular one and the “MIT brew.” The latter was 
adultered with balsamic vinegar (an ingredient that, with the dose used in the 
experiments, does not degrade the flavor of the beer, but sounds unappealing for 
participants). A group of participants tasted both beers without knowing of the balsamic 
vinegar, another group was told of the balsamic vinegar in the “MIT brew” before 
tasting the beers, and another group received this information right after tasting the 
beers. Preference for the “MIT brew” was lower among those who received the 
information before drinking the beer. Preference of participants who received the 
information after drinking the beer was no different from the preference of blind tasters. 
In essence, awareness of the balsamic vinegar shaped participants’ thoughts about 
the taste of the beer even before they experienced what the beer actually tasted like, 
forming the expectation of a bad taste. This expectation came true in the drinking 




A different example of how top-down processing can conform experiences to 
expectations is given by Klaaren et al. (1994). In a study where participants watched 
Charlie Chaplin’s The Immigrant, the experimenter said things suggesting that the 
movie was good and enjoyable to half of the participants before they watched it, 
promoting the expectation of a positive experience. The affective expectation 
established by such prior information colored participants’ movie experiences: those 
who heard the positive comments from the experimenter reported enjoying the movie 
more than those who did not hear any comment. 
Lee et al.’s beer experiments and Klaaren et al.’s movie experiment illustrate how 
the subjective nature of experiences allows self-fulfilling prophecies to arise and make 
the same experience feel different. In both cases, an external force (information about 
the upcoming experience) was internalized in people’s schemata to cope with and 
process the upcoming experience. The beliefs that incorporated the external information 
about the experience pre-shaped perceptions of what the experience was like. But can 
internal forces inform these beliefs and exert this same kind of influence on an 
upcoming experience? 
Recall that, in Studies 2 and 3, Internet search led participants to estimate that they 
would be capable of selecting the superior option even before they engaged in the 
decision task and knew the alternatives from which they could choose. An interpretation 
of these studies is that participants’ Google-induced overconfidence produced positive 
expectations about their own future choices. In essence, because mastering the skills to 
select superior options from a set of alternatives should lead to optimal choices, 




Because choice superiority of subjective experiences is not objectively verifiable, 
such an expectation can guide how the individual feels and perceives her or his 
experience even when confidence in decision skills incorporates metacognitive errors 
induced by the Internet. These errors will simply not be corrected by the subjective 
experience. Moreover, in addition to the spillover of affective expectations into the 
experience, confidence-driven expectations can exert a reinforcing effect on choice 
perception by refraining post-choice uncertainty, which can occupy the individual’s 
mind with “what if” thoughts about the dismissed alternatives and impede immersion in 
the experience with the chosen option. In line with this idea, previous research has 
found that individuals with “greater subjective knowledge are likely to feel less 
confused and more certain about the quality of their choice” (Raju et al., 1995, p. 175). 
Studies 4 and 5 explored the idea that inflated confidence in decision-making skills 
due to Internet search improves subjective experiences by forming the belief that these 




STUDY 4: GOOGLE-INDUCED CONFIDENCE IMPROVES EXPERIENCES 
 
Inspired by previous research on the effects of affective expectations on experience 
enjoyment (Klaaren et al., 1994), Study 4 explored experiences with movies. 
Specifically, this study used short animated films. 
The basic idea of Study 4 was to boost participants’ confidence in their abilities to 
make film choices by having them search for information related to animation and 
movies on the Internet. Then, participants would have the opportunity to choose an 
animated short film. After watching the chosen film, participants would complete 
measures that should reveal if their experience was different from that of participants 
who accessed the same information without online search. 
Besides experience enjoyment, two other outcomes of Google-induced 
overconfidence were examined after participants watched the film. One of them 
assessed choice evaluation, which should be more positive among participants with 
overconfidence induced by the Internet. The other one assessed choice confidence, 
strategically measured by assessing participants’ belief in the superiority of the film 
they chose to watch in relation to the dismissed options. Internet search should trick 
participants into forming stronger beliefs in the superiority of the selected option. 
Both these choice-related measures were designed to help mapping greater 
enjoyment not simply to extra confidence and self-esteem in the area of films, but 
specifically to confidence in decision abilities in this domain. This is a central analysis 
for the self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis elaborated in the previous section. External to 
this hypothesis, non-choice-related forces that can emerge from Internet search could 
contribute to increased enjoyment. One such force could be individuals’ engagement 
with the domain of the stimulus: more so than receiving information without search, 
googling facts about animation and films might boost interest and set up a more 
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favorable affective state to go through experiences with animated films in general. In 
this case, experience enjoyment might be increase after searching the Internet, but 
perpections of choice superiority should be necessarily higher. 
Another potential force stems actually from confidence, but not in the strict sense of 
positive perceptions of one’s own decision skills and rather unrelated to expectations 
occasioned by these perceptions. A sense of mastery of cognitive skills that are relevant 
in a specific context might elevate feelings of preparedness to navigate through 
experiences that occur in that context (the Google effect on the persuasion knowledge 
dimension of consumer self-confidence [Study 1] might reflect this phenomenon to a 
certain extent). This overall self-perceived capacity to navigate through the experience 
can be a source of enjoyment. 
These (and other) factors might contribute for a better film experience after online 
search, but here I focus on how Google-induced confidence in decision skills changes 
experiences. Better post-experience choice evaluation and increased choice confidence 




Participants and design 
Participants (N = 310, after the exclusion of 40 participants who stopped watching 
the film before the end credits and 5 participants who admitted interrupting the study to 
do some unrelated task3) were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and completed 
                                                          
3 Neither skipping part of the film nor interrupting the study was associated with the experimental 
condition, X2(1) = 0.003, p = .95 and X2(1) = 1.31, p = .253, respectively. 
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the study on Qualtrics. The experiment followed a single-factor design with two levels: 
no search vs. online search. 
 
Procedure 
Study 4 involved three phases. Each phase is described below. 
Phase 1. The first section consisted in an information exposure procedure in the 
same vein as Studies 1-3. However, instead of reading travel-related information, 
participants read about topics related to movies – in some cases with a specific focus on 
movie animation (e.g., “What is CGI animation”? – see full list in Appendix A). 
The topics and information used to induce overconfidence returned to the quick 
answer format adopted in Study 2. That is, all topics were selected so that, when using 
them as the search term on Google, the results page would provide a straightforward 
answer in the “Answer Box” on the top of the page followed by results in the traditional 
format (i.e., links). As in Study 2, participants randomly assigned to the online search 
condition received a link that would open Google on a new window and were instructed 
to search information about each topic online. The instructions explicitly said that the 
information in the “Answer Box” was sufficient for the study. The same information 
was presented to participants in the no search condition without requiring them to 
engage in online search. Each participant received five randomly selected topics. 
The quick answer format was preferred in this study because of the introduction of 
a new phase in the procedure, Phase 2 – a choice and experience section. This factor 
combined with the information format adopted in Studies 1 and 3 (full articles instead 
of quick answers) could make the experiment excessively demanding and lead to fatigue 
and disengagement of participants before they completed the study. Importantly, in the 
current study, the disadvantages of using quick answers revealed by Study 2 should not 
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affect the results. In Study 2, it was hypothesized that the quick answer format led no 
search participants to infer that the difficulty of the decision task in Phase 2 was lower 
(compared to the other groups), leading them to display the same levels of confidence as 
participants who had their confidence inflated by Google-induced feelings of already 
knowing information found online. In the current study, at no point beliefs about the 
upcoming parts of the study were measured. Instead, the outcome measures are 
backward-looking (see Measures). Also, terms that allude to the notion of a challenge or 
any kind of test of skills (e.g., “quiz”) were not used in prompts and instructions of the 
experiment to avoid performance concerns and related thoughts about the technical 
difficulty of parts of the study that could influence participants’ self-confidence. 
Phase 2. The second part of Study 4 consisted in a choice and experience phase. In 
the beginning of this phase, participants read the following introduction: 
 
In this section, you will be presented with three short animated film options. 
These short animations were created by film students from different film 
schools around the world during their internships in professional studios and 
will be officially released during a festival on July (details will be provided at 
the end of the study).  
  
Based on the information that will be provided for each film option and using 
your ability to make film choices (as when you go to movie theaters), you will 
choose a short animated film to watch. 
  




 Participants had the opportunity to select a short-animated film from a set of three 
options: “The Answer,” by Florent Rubio and Xin Zhao (2015); “Réflexion,” by 
Planktoon and Yoshi Tamura (2012); and “The God4,” by Konstantin Bronzit (2003). 
These films were pretested with a separate sample (N = 88) to ensure they no systematic 
effect of the film on experience enjoyment. Participants of the pretest were randomly 
assigned to watch one of the three movies and then expressed how much they liked it 
(same measure as in the main study – see Measures). The pretest showed no differences 
across films, F(2, 85) = 0.27, p = .762. 
Film frequency was the same across experimental groups, X2(2) = 1.48, p = .48, 
suggesting that the experimental condition did not affect participants’ choices. More 
importantly, this means that although three different films were watched across the 
sample, both experimental groups had virtually the same experience. 
Phase 3. Participants reported how much they liked the short animation 
(experience enjoyment) and completed the measures of choice evaluation and choice 
confidence. No item assessing participants’ thoughts about the quality of their film 
choice was presented before the film experience because of the risk that participants 
would complete post-experience measures in an effort to remain consistent with their 
own responses provided just before watching the film and considering their own 
theories about the purpose of the study (i.e., demand effects – Orne, 1962). This 
behavior would diminish the impact of objective features of the experience on their 
post-experience responses, clouding the influence of affective expectations driven by 
the experimentally induced extra confidence due to a commitment to previously 
exposed beliefs. Moreover, Studies 1-3 demonstrate Google-induced confidence in 
decision skills before experiencing one’s own chosen option. Studies 2 and 3 show 
                                                          
4 No official page from the creators with or about this film was found when this document was prepared. 
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Google-induced confidence in the quality of a specific decision even before the 
opportunity to make that decision. Considering that this pre-choice confidence has been 
established, in the current study, instead of increasing chances of demand effects, 
differences in decision-related measures that succeeded the film experience were 
conceptually mapped to the positive illusions evidenced in the previous experiments 
(see the “Measures” section). 
On the final page Phase 3, participants completed personal information questions 
and were thanked and debriefed. The complete dataset is available at OSF. 
 
Measures 
Choice evaluation, choice confidence, and experience enjoyment were measured in 
this study. 
Choice evaluation consisted of a question asking “What do you think about your 
film choice?” with answers ranging from 1 = It was a very bad choice to 7 = It was a 
very good choice. Because this variable was measured after participants watched the 
animated film, responses were likely colored by information from the film experience. 
At the same time, by asking the question in terms of the “choice,” instead of the film or 
the experience, this item should capture reminiscent information about participants’ 
affective expectation – which was not measured before they watched the film to avoid 
demand effects and attempted response consistency. This is an important consideration 
for the serial mediation model examined in this study (more details in the “Results” 
section). 
The measure of choice confidence asked participants to complete the following 
item, “Considering the three film options you could choose from, you believe the one 
you chose is:” using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = Much worse than the others to 7 = 
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Much better than the others. Again, by framing the item in terms of the “choice” and, 
also, capitalizing on the fact that participants did not have the opportunity to watch the 
dismissed options, this measure attempted to capture information that anteceded the 
experience – in this case, participants’ confidence in the higher quality of their selected 
option. Without this swollen confidence being brought into the experience, participants 
should process information from the experience in such a way that the inferred quality 
of the dismissed options would be of a similar level (i.e., the experience would be used 
as a reference point). 
Experience enjoyment was measured by asking participants “How much did you 
like the film you watched?” (7-point scale, 1 = I strongly disliked it, 7 = I liked it very 
much). 




Results revealed that choice evaluations of participants who accessed film-related 
knowledge through online search before choosing the short film was better (M = 5.26, 
SD = 1.53) than the evaluations of those who were exposed to the same knowledge 
without online search (M = 4.88, SD = 1.74), t(308) = 2.01, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.76], p = 
.045, d = 0.23 (Figure 8). Participants who searched the information online were also 
more confident that their chosen option was superior to the dismissed alternatives (M = 
4.99, SD = 1.34) compared to participants who did not search online (M = 4.67, SD = 
1.46), t(308) = 2.00, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.65], p = .046, d = 0.23 (Figure 9). Thus, it seems 
that inflated perceptions of decision skills were reflected in participants’ feelings and 
perceptions even after they experienced their chosen option. This inflation was such that 
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participants remained confident that they achieved the best possible outcome given the 
set of alternatives even though they had no access to the rejected alternatives to make 











Figure 9. Means and ± SEM of choice confidence across search conditions in Study 4. 
 
 
In line with the self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis, the online search group also 
reported higher levels of enjoyment of the experience (M = 5.19, SD = 1.46) compared 
to the no search group (M = 4.84, SD = 1.64), with the significance level of this 
difference approaching the typical threshold of alpha = .05, t(308) = 1.95, 95% CI = [-









To demonstrate elements of the mechanistic the process behind this phenomenon 
(that were not explored in Studies 2 and 3), choice confidence and choice evaluations 
were tested as mediators of the Google effect on experience enjoyment. Initially, choice 
confidence was examined in a simple mediation model (Figure 11). The model builds 
on the idea that positive perceptions of one’s own capacity to make optimal decisions 
(even when inaccurate) guide confidence in the quality of one’s choice, and such 
confidence alters one’s experience with the chosen option. Results of the path analysis 
are shown in Table 4. The test showed that choice confidence mediated a significant 
indirect effect of online search on enjoyment, b = 0.26, BCa bootstrap 95% CI with 





Figure 11. Mediation model used to examine the role of choice confidence (confidence 
in the superiority of the selected experience relative to the dismissed ones) in Google-
driven influences on subjective experiences in Studies 4 and 5. 
 
 
Table 4. Results of the path analysis of the single mediator model in Study 4: 
unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, test statistics, and Pearson correlations. 
Path b SE Test r  
a 0.33 0.16 95% CI = [0.01, 0.66], t(308) = 2.00, p = .046 .11 
b 0.79 0.04 95% CI = [0.71, 0.88], t(307) = 17.89, p < .001 .71 
c' 0.09 0.13 95% CI = [-0.16, 0.35], t(307) = 0.74, p = .458 .04 
Note: Based on the mediation model in Figure 11. 
 
 
This mediation analysis supports the idea that confidence in decision-skills induced 
by Internet search informed beliefs of choice superiority, which spilled over into and 
improved the film experience. It follows that to the extent that the selected option was 
believed to be the best alternative, participants should expect that experiencing it would 
confirm the quality of their choice. In turn, this expectation adds to the objective 
features of the chosen option – which are the same for any person –, producing a 
different subjective experience with the same content. Assuming that participants’ 
choice evaluations included reminiscent information about this affective expectation, 
choice evaluation should mediate the relationship between choice confidence and 
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experience enjoyment. With this in mind, choice evaluation was introduced in the 




Figure 12. Serial mediation model used to examine the role of choice evaluation 
(affective expectation) as an outcome of Google-induced choice confidence that 
changes subjective experiences in Studies 4 and 5. 
 
Results of the path analysis are shown in Table 5. The analysis of the indirect 
effects revealed that choice confidence mediated the influence of Internet search on 
choice evaluation, b = 0.29, BCa bootstrap 95% CI with 10,000 samples = [0.02, 0.58]. 
Despite the introduction of choice evaluation as a predictor of enjoyment, the indirect 
effect of Internet search on enjoyment mediated by choice confidence was still 
significant, b = 0.03, BCa bootstrap 95% CI with 10,000 samples = [0.001, 0.11]. When 
choice evaluation was tested as a single-mediator of the relationship between Internet 
search and film enjoyment in this model, the indirect effect was not significant, b = 
0.08, BCa bootstrap 95% CI with 10,000 samples = [-0.11, 0.26]. However, choice 
evaluation mediated how choice confidence affected enjoyment, b = 0.69, BCa 
bootstrap 95% CI with 10,000 samples = [0.57, 0.80]. The fact that the effect of choice 
confidence on enjoyment remained significant while accounting for choice evaluation as 
a predictor/mediator is indicative of the existence of other factors explaining a relevant 
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portion of this relationship. On the other hand, the correlation between choice 
evaluation and experience enjoyment was stronger than the correlation of enjoyment 
with choice confidence, which decreased to a considerable compared to the same 
estimate of the correlation in the one mediator model. Combined with the significant 
indirect effect of choice confidence on enjoyment mediated by choice evaluation, this 
difference in effect sizes supports the proposed order of factors in the process. Because 
the model of this process was built on the assumptions that these measures are informed 
by a state of confidence in decision skills and affective expectations that preceded the 
experience, such results also support these assumptions. Importantly, the indirect effect 
of the serial mediation was significant, b = 0.23, bootstrap BCa bootstrap 95% CI with 
10,000 samples = [0.01, 0.46]. In conclusion, given the assumptions outlined in the 
introduction of the current study, the analysis supports the concept that the extra 
confidence in decision skills emanated from the use of Google gives rise to beliefs of 
choice superiority, which inform affective expectations about the chosen experience and 
ultimately change how the experience itself. 
 
Table 5. Results of the path analysis of the two-mediator model in Study 4: 
unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, test statistics, and Pearson correlations. 
Path b SE Test r 
a1 0.33 0.16 95% CI = [0.01, 0.66], t(308) = 2.00, p = .046 .11 
a2 0.1 0.13 95% CI = [-0.15, 0.34], t(307) = 0.79, p = .449 .04 
d 0.88 0.04 95% CI = [0.80, 0.97], t(307) = 20.11, p < .001 .75 
b1 0.1 0.04 95% CI = [0.02, 0.18], t(306) = 2.35, p = .020 .09 
b2 0.78 0.04 95% CI = [0.71, 0.86], t(306) = 21.63, p < .001 .51 
c' 0.02 0.14 95% CI = [-0.14, 0.18], t(306) = 0.24, p = .808 .04 







Study 4 demonstrated that the overconfidence in decision-making skills that arises 
as a consequence of engaging in Internet search can improve experiences related to the 
domain of the information found online. Although theoretical accounts and even results 
give margins for other factors driving this phenomenon as well, results indicate that this 
overconfidence breeds positive expectations that shape subjective experiences. Alas, to 
empirically explore the roles of this metacognitive miscalibration and the consequent 
beliefs that end up molding subjective experiences, Study 4 relied solely on measures 
collected after the film experience. It was theorized that, to a reasonable degree, these 
measures reflect assessments (of decision skills and expected quality) that preceded the 
experience. Still, empirically they were correlational variables. Inevitably, along with 
information about confidence in decision-making skills and affective expectations that 
indeed emerge before participants watched the film, these measures were also informed 
by the objective components of the film experience. In consideration of this limitation, 
Study 5 was designed to provide additional support to the proposed process through 
which Google searches can alter experiences. 
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STUDY 5: GOOGLE-INDUCED CONFIDENCE IMPROVES CHOSEN 
EXPERIENCES 
 
To not solely rely on the mediation analysis of Study 4, this experiment was 
designed with the purpose of shedding light on the underlying process of the self-
fulfilling prophecy by removing a critical component of this process, a component 
without which, according to the proposed model, the “prophecy cannot be fulfilled.” 
If extra confidence in decision skills is in the heart of how changes in the subjective 
experience of the same content arise from using Google, the subjective experience 
should be the same regardless of whether it was preceded by Internet search or not if 
these decision skills never came into play when the content was selected. To be more 
precise, the positive expectations that mold the subjective experience echo a reliance on 
the high quality of the selected option that stems from (confidence in) these skills. If the 
experience was never selected by the individual who was induced to be overconfident, 




Participants and design 
Participants (N = 519, after the exclusion of 73 participants who did not watch the 
film until the end credits and 5 participants who admitted interrupting5) were recruited 
on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and completed the study on Qualtrics. The experiment 
                                                          
5 Skipping the film and interrupting the study were not related to the search condition, X2(1) < 0.001, p = 
.998 and X2(1) = 0.04, p = .841, respectively, nor choice condition, X2(1) = 0.05, p = .825 and X2(1) < 
0.001, p =1, respectively. 
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followed a 2 (search: no search vs. online search) x 2 (choice: no vs. yes) design and 
random assignment of participants. 
 
Procedure 
Study 5 employed the same procedure and materials used in Study 4, except that, in 
Phase 2, the no choice group read the following introduction: 
 
 In this section, you will watch a short animated film created by film 
students during their internships in professional studios. The film will be 
officially released during a festival on July (details will be provided at the 
end of the study). 
After watching the film, you will complete a short questionnaire about it. 
 
Following this introduction, instead of selecting a film, these participants were 
directed to a page where they watched an animated film randomly selected from the set 
of options available for participants in the choice condition to choose. Although the film 
experience was not randomized in the choice condition, film choice was not 
systematically different between participants in the no search and the online search 
conditions, X2(2, N = 258) = 0.28, p = .868. 
Full dataset is available at OSF. 
 
Measures 
Study 5 used the same measures as Study 4, but choice confidence and choice 
evaluation were only collected from the choice condition (because these measures were 
meaningless for participants who did not have the opportunity to make a film choice). 
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With these measures, the mediation models examined in Study 4 could be tested in a 
new sample. 
In addition to the measures mentioned above, participants general liking of 
animated films (single item: “How much do you like animated films?”, 1 = I hate 
animated films, 7 = I love animated films) was incorporated in the analysis plan. This 
was a particular concern because of the inclusion of the choice manipulation. The more 
a person likes watching animations, the more receptive that person will be to the 
opportunity to watch an animated film, even when the choice of the film is not their 
own. Because of this, general preference for animations and its interaction with the 
choice condition of the experiment were factored into the analysis. These factors could 
be positive confounders and override the focal effects of online search and its 
interaction with choosing a film, but could also be negative confounders and push the 
effect of the interaction between the experimental conditions closer to the null 
hypothesis when not included in the model (Mehio-Sibai, Feinleib, Sibai, & Armenian, 
2005). 
A pre-analysis of the data supported the idea that overall appreciation of animated 
movies undermines the importance of the opportunity to choose the film experience. 
Participants’ liking of animated movies was mean-centered and tested for an interaction 
with the choice condition (coded as 0 = no choice, 1 = choice). The interaction was 
found to be significant, b = -0.18, SE = 0.09, 95% CI = [-0.36, -0.003], t(515) = 2.00, p 
= .046, r = -.09. Using a spotlight approach (Irwin & McClelland, 2001), it was found 
that at one standard deviation above the mean, whether participants could choose the 
film or not did not influence their experience enjoyment, b = -0.13, SE = 0.18, 95% CI = 
[-0.48, 0.22], t(515) = 0.72, p = .471. In turn, at one standard deviation below the mean, 
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participants enjoyed more the experience when they were able to select the film, b = 
0.38, SE = 0.18, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.74], t(515) = 2.11, p = .035, r = .09. 
The opportunity to choose also changed the extent to which liking animations 
predicted liking the animated film of the experiment. It was a stronger predictor when 
participants watched a random film, b = 0.48, SE = 0.06, 95% CI = [0.36, 0.60], t(515) 
=  7.95, p < .001, r = .33, than when they watched a film of their choice, b = 0.30, SE = 
0.07, 95% CI = [0.16, 0.43], t(515) = 4.35, p < .001, r = .19. 
Given the pre-analysis, both the extent to which the participants liked animations 
and its interactions with the choice condition should act as negative confounders on the 
effect of the interaction between the experimental conditions. Specifically, the 
coefficient of the effect of these variables on enjoyment (reported above) were positive 
and negative, respectively. Their associations with the interaction between the 
experimental conditions were negative (r = -.03) and positive (r = .02), respectively – 
related note: search condition was coded as 0 = no search, 1 = online search. Finally, 
the relationship of the interaction between the experimental conditions and enjoyment 
was positive (r = .09 – complete results of this relationship are reported below). This 
configuration of associations involving the outcome variable, the interaction of the 
manipulated variables, and the hypothesized confounders anticipates a negative 




An ANCOVA revealed a significant effect of the interaction between the two 
experimental conditions on enjoyment of the animated film, F(1, 513) = 4.52, p = .034, 
ƞ2 = .01. This interaction was qualified by how much participants liked watching 
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animated movies in general, F(1, 513) = 63.90, p < .001, ƞ2 = .13, and its interaction 
with whether participants were able to choose the film or not, F(1, 513) = 4.14, p = 
.042, ƞ2 = .01. Both factors were shown to be negative confounders, but, overall, results 
held the same when not adjusting enjoyment for their influence. When not accounting 
for the confounding interaction and testing preferences for animated movies as the 
single confounder, the effects of the remaining confounder and the interaction between 
the experimental conditions were essentially the same, ƞ2 = .13 and ƞ2 = .01, 
respectively. There was an improvement of the F-statistic and significance level of the 
confounder, F(1, 514) = 78.18, p < .001, and a small downgrade in the F-statistic and 
significance level of the interaction, F(1, 514) = 4.36, p = .037. When not accounting 
for any confounding variable, there was a greater weakening of the F-statistic of the 
interaction between conditions, F(1, 515) = 3.55, and its significance level became 
marginally significant, p = .060. These changes in F-statistics and significance levels 
support that liking animations and its interaction with choice opportunity are negative 
confounders of the relationship between the manipulations (interacting with each other) 
and experience enjoyment, but also suggest that the manipulations were sufficiently 
effective to reveal clear patterns when film enjoyment was not adjusted for them. 
Results of the ANCOVA with adjustment for the two confounders are represented in 
Figure 13. 
Planned comparisons showed that enjoyment levels were significantly higher 
among participants in the online search group that were able to choose the animated 
film they would watch (M = 5.21, SD = 1.43), t(513) = 2.28, p = .023. Results held 
when only accounting for preference for animations as a confounder, t(514) = 2.25, p = 
.025, and when not accounting for the control variables t(515) = 2.55, p = .011. Film 
enjoyment levels of participants who searched online but did not have the opportunity to 
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choose the film (M = 4.79, SD = 1.43), participants who did not search but chose an 
animated film (M = 4.84, SD = 1.43), and participants who neither searched nor chose 
the film (M = 4.96, SD = 1.44) were statistically the same, all t < 0.94, p > .34 
(regardless of whether the analysis included confounding variables or not). This finding 
shows that miscalibrated decision confidence can only improve a subjective experience 
when the content of the experience was selected. Such concept is in line with the idea 
that the influence of confidence on the subjective experience occurs through affective 




Figure 13. Means and ± SEM of experience enjoyment across experimental conditions 




Next, focus was directed towards the choice group and the choice-related measures 
in an attempt to replicate results from Study 4. Searching online again produced better 
choice evaluations (M = 5.34, SD = 1.64) than accessing the same information without 
online search (M = 4.97, SD = 1.47), with the significance level of the difference 
between the conditions slightly above the alpha = .05 cut off mark, t(256) = 1.85, 95% 
CI = [-0.02, 0.75], p = .066, d = 0.24. Means and standard errors of choice evaluation 
are shown in Figure 14. As expected, when accounting for how much participants liked 
animations in general, the F-statistics barely changed: F(1, 256) = 3.41 without 
confounder and F(1, 255) = 3.44 with it. The influence of the confounder on the 
significance level was also negligible, p = .065. Recall that the pre-analysis suggested 
that people’s general appreciation for experiences in a given category (in this case, 








Google effects on choice confidence were replicated as well (Figure 15). The 
online search group reported greater confidence that their selected film was better than 
the dismissed options (M = 4.89, SD = 1.36) compared to the no search group (M = 
4.50, SD = 1.39), t(256) = 2.30, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.74], p = .022, d = 0.28. As expected, 
introducing participants’ preference for animations as a confounder had a negligible 
influence on the F-statistics of this effect, with F(1, 256) = 5.29 without the confounder 
and F(1, 255) = 5.32 when accounting for it. Relatedly, the p-value adjusted for the 
confounder was the same when rounded to the third decimal place. 
 
 





The mediation models explored in Study 4 were tested again in this new sample. 
Because, liking animations was shown not to be a substantial confounding variable 
when examining Google effects on choice evaluation and choice confidence, it was not 
included in this analysis. Thus, the models represented in Figure 11 and Figure 12 were 
not modified for the tests with the current sample. 
Results of the path analysis of the single mediator model (Figure 11) are detailed in 
Table 6. The analysis again revealed a significant indirect effect of online search on 
enjoyment mediated by choice confidence, b = 0.30, BCa bootstrap 95% CI with 10,000 
samples= [0.05, 0.67].  
 
 
Table 6. Results of the path analysis of the single mediator model in Study 5: 
unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, test statistics, and Pearson correlations. 
Path b SE Test r 
a 0.40 0.17 95% CI = [0.06, 0.74], t(256) = 2.30, p = .022 .14 
b 0.77 0.05 95% CI = [0.67, 0.86], t(255) = 15.18, p < .001 .69 
c' 0.07 0.14 95% CI = [-0.21, 0.35], t(255) = 0.51, p = .610 .03 
Note: Based on the mediation model in Figure 11. 
 
 
The path analysis of the serial mediation is shown in Table 7. The analysis of the 
indirect effects showed that the influence of Internet search on choice evaluation was 
mediated by participants’ confidence in the superior quality of their choice, b = 0.35, 
BCa bootstrap 95% CI with 10,000 samples = [0.06, 0.64]. With the introduction of 
choice evaluation as a predictor of film enjoyment, the indirect effect of Internet search 
on enjoyment mediated by this confidence (observed in the single mediator model) was 
no longer significant, b = 0.02, BCa bootstrap 95% CI with 10,000 samples = [-0.01, 
0.08]. In turn, there was a significant indirect effect of choice confidence on experience 
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enjoyment mediated by choice evaluation, b = 0.72, BCa bootstrap 95% CI with 10,000 
samples = [0.63, 0.81]. Unlike Study 4 (and in even greater alignment with the 
revolving the choice confidence and choice evaluation measures and with the proposed 
model), when accounting for choice evaluation as a predictor of enjoyment, the direct 
effect of choice confidence on enjoyment was not simply weakened, it actually became 
null. Finally, the indirect effect of Internet search on film enjoyment was serially 
mediated by choice confidence and choice evaluation, b = 0.28, BCa bootstrap 95% CI 
with 10,000 samples = [0.05, 0.54]. 
 
Table 7. Results of the path analysis of the two-mediator model in Study 5: 
unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, test statistics, and Pearson correlations. 
Path b SE Test r 
a1 0.40 0.17 95% CI = [0.06, 0.74], t(256) = 2.30, p = .022 .14 
a2 0.02 0.13 95% CI = [-0.24, 0.27], t(255) = 0.14, p = .888 .01 
D 0.87 0.05 95% CI = [0.78, 0.96], t(255) = 18.84, p < .001 .76 
b1 0.04 0.05 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.14], t(254) = .88, p = .381 .04 
b2 0.83 0.04 95% CI = [0.74, 0.91], t(254) = 18.57, p < .001 .49 
c' 0.06 0.09 95% CI = [-0.12, 0.24], t(254) = 0.62, p = .537 .04 




Building on the model initially explored in Study 4, Study 5 adopted an ablata 
causa tollitur effectus approach to cancel the influence of Internet search on an 
experience. Because, according to the proposed model, a central piece of the process 
consists in the individual choosing the content of the experience (without this piece, 
positive expectations about the upcoming experience are not formed), the strategy 
employed in the study was to eliminate the decision component of the experimental 
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procedure used in half the participants. As expected, these participants did not go 
through a different subjective experience with the film they watched during the 
experiment as a consequence of whether they were exposed to the Internet stimulus or 
not. 
The group that had the opportunity to choose an animated film had different 
subjective experiences depending on whether they searched the Internet or not. 
Replicating findings of Study 4, Google effects improved their film experience. For a 
second time, the serial mediation model suggested that this influence on film experience 
is self-fulfilling. Participants in the online search group convinced themselves that the 
film they chose was the best film available in the list, even though they never had the 
opportunity to watch the other films. This suggests their assessments were built on their 
self-perceived decision abilities, more so than the actual film experience, and they were 
likely confident in their decision even before watching the film. This confidence 
informed a positive evaluation of the film that started to take form before the film 
experience. In turn, the subjective experience with the film conformed to this 
preconceived evaluation. 
Importantly, the preconceived evaluation (i.e., the affective expectation) added to 
the perceived quality of the film, which was also informed by the objective features of 
the film, leading participants with Google-induced overconfidence to have a better 
experience than others. The influence of the objective features of the experience is 
reflected in the (lower) enjoyment levels of participants who did not search the Internet 
and could not choose the film. The difference between them and the group that had the 
subjective experience altered due to inflated confidence in decision skills reflects the 






The experiments presented here demonstrate that Google-induced deregulation of 
metacognition does not only affect self-perceived intelligence as assessed in knowledge 
tests and cognitive self-esteem – shown in previous research. This miscalibration is 
reflected in decision tasks as well. Google-induced knowledge misattribution creates a 
false sense of prior knowledge in the domain of the decision task that makes people feel 
more capable of judging choice alternatives and identifying a superior option. This 
perceived capacity to make high-quality decisions, albeit illusory, is confirmed in 
people’s subjective experiences with the option they selected. The superior experience 
is not a consequence of an objectively better decision. Subjective experiences are 
enhanced because they are colored by affective expectations that people form based on 
their self-assessment of their own decision skills, following an “if I chose it, it must be 
good” line of reasoning. 
Illuminating how this self-fulfilling prophecy unfolds from the simple act of 
searching the Internet is not only a contribution to the new area of Google effects on 
(meta)cognition; the findings highlight self-fulfilling phenomena in consumer 
experiences. Studies 4 and 5 showed that positive expectations about choice quality 
spilled over into people’s experiences with the film they chose to watch and increased 
their satisfaction. In a similar vein, the “MIT brew” studies described in the 
“RESEARCH BACKGROUND II: THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY OF 
GOOGLE-INDUCED DECISION CONFIDENCE” section can be interpreted as 
showing that fomenting negative expectations led to lower satisfaction with the beer. 
These findings might seem out of tune with the typical view of expectations as reference 
points to performance evaluations and satisfaction as a function of the (dis)confirmation 
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of such expectations (Oliver, 1980; Spreng, MacKenzie, & Olshavsky, 1996). 
According to the expectancy disconfirmation framework, overly optimistic expectations 
about the film should lead to greater dissatisfaction with the experience and lower 
expectations about the “MIT brew” should make it easier for the drinking experience to 
exceed expectations and increase satisfaction with the beer. The question of when a self-
fulfilling expectation vs. the disconfirmation of expectations will be a stronger 
determinant of satisfaction is an interesting one and might shed light on an overlooked 
problem in an old area of consumer research – consumer satisfaction. 
A possible reason why experiments like Studies 4 and 5 show that the liking of 
experiences conforms to expectations (instead of being affected by disconfirmation) lies 
in the combination of the holistic nature of the expectations fomented in these studies 
and the subjective nature of the experiences they explored. In the expectancy 
disconfirmation framework, expectations are usually defined in terms of the 
performance of specific attributes or features of the content of the experience (e.g., 
Spreng et al., 1996). For the disconfirmation of this type of expectation to determine 
levels of satisfaction, consumers must be able to track and examine each relevant 
attribute or feature. However, expectations that have self-fulfilling influences do not 
emphasize specific features of the content of the experience. They simply provide a 
rough cue of its quality. Moreover, even though experiential content like movies and 
trips – and, sometimes, food and beverages – might have objective features that can be 
pinpointed if one wants to, the experiences that this kind of content provides tend to 
build on the blending of several features into a global experience. Because of this, 
people do not focus on the individual performance of each feature unless they are 
stimulated to do so (e.g., someone tells them to pay special attention to the soundtrack 
of a movie). If the positive expectation does not specify features of the content and the 
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evaluation of the experience does not involve processing individual feature 
performance, the subjective experience will likely be anchored on the experiential 
elements that better align with the expectations (i.e., the things that work well during the 
experience), turning the expectation into a personal subjective reality. 
While I certainly believe that the conciliation of self-fulfilling and disconfirming 
influences of expectations is not a trivial research problem, there are a number of other 
insights and notes tightly connected to the contributions and limitations of the current 
set of studies that I would like to address here. I present these thoughts organized into 
three overarching topics next. 
 
Technology and self-fulfilling prophecies 
 
A broad theme related to the findings of this research involves the extent to which, 
beyond Google effects, modern life makes confidence inflation a common phenomenon 
and produces an excess of self-fulfilling experiences. This theme involves two 
overaching avenues: (1) addressing questions related to how pervasive is the 
intensification of metacognitive miscralibration as a result of interaction with 
technology, and (2) exploring far reaching consequences of self-fulfilling prophecies 
induced by this kind of interaction. 
In previous studies that explored self-fulfilling expectations, beliefs about the 
upcoming experience were formed based on external information provided to 
participants. Studies 4 and 5 charted new territories by showing that internal forces (i.e., 
confidence in decision skills) can determine such expectations. 
There is something interesting about affective expectations related to the outcomes 
of personal decisions being influenced by internal forces – especially positive illusions 
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– because they might be much harder to circumvent. People might learn to recalibrate 
their expectations when they are exposed to external information using their judgments 
about the source and the quality of the information. For instance, if information comes 
from a source that has incentives to lead people to form positive expectations, people 
have some intuition that they should not let blindly allow themselves to be influenced 
by that information. However, internal forces like beliefs in one’s own capacity to make 
optimal decisions might be much more persuasive than external sources with 
manipulative intentions. Concepts held internally tend to be considered true and 
complete until proven otherwise and people do not seem to actively question their 
validity (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Collins et al., 1975; Gilbert, 1991). Thus, even 
when equally misleading, affective expectations driven by positive metacognitive 
illusions might be more stable than those driven by external influencers. 
Self-fulfilling prophecies might also be surprisingly present in our lives. 
Considering that people tend to be positively miscalibrated in nature (Moore & Healy, 
2008), decision-related self-fulfilling prophecies might be more common than we have 
recognized so far. As a matter of fact, in Studies 4 and 5, one might argue that there is 
some degree of a self-fulfilling influence in the levels of film enjoyment of no search 
participants – because, as average people, they probably are overconfident as well –, but 
this influence was stronger in the online search group because their overconfidence was 
boosted by Internet search. However, what I would like to underline here is that, beyond 
Google itself, technological advances might have produced an environment where 
people are heedlessly surrounded by and have immediate access to an immense 




Historically, technology has been brought into the world with the intent of helping 
people overcome their natural limitations. From clothes being, at some point, cutting-
edge technology to help us better protect our bodies against the weather and physical 
threats of the environment to motorized vehicles that, essentially, make as faster, 
technology has been used to enhance our capacity to do things that our human resources 
cannot do. Whereas much of the past technological developments have focused on 
overcoming our physical limitations, in recent years, there has been a more intense 
advance in the expansion our capacity to execute cognitively demanding tasks. The GPS 
improves our sense of direction and location, electronic calendars and notifications 
boost our memory and organization capacities, information aggregators release us from 
the mental labor of gathering information from different sources, etc. Most of these 
advanced cognitive aids are readily accessible in our computers and smartphones – 
which, in turn, are readily accessible on our desks and in our pockets. Similar to how 
people fail to separate their own memory from Google, they might conflate the 
performance of other cognitive tools and their own. 
Furthermore, the cognition-enhancing functions of information technology might 
not be the only forces in our connected lives that propitiate miscalibration. The online 
environments of the everyday life are designed to be hedonically appealing and often 
stimulate addiction (Block, 2008). While online experiences are engineered to avoid 
that users feel uncomfortable and incapable, they might overdose in the opposite 
direction, stimulating positive illusions. For instance, it has become clear that while 
platforms are programmed to bring information of people’s interests and like-minded 
users closer, they create information bubbles where people’s views and opinions about 
the world are constantly echoed and rarely challenged (Parisier, 2011). Seeing repeated 
arguments about our own opinions and interpretations of reality coming from different 
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sources might lead us to think of these opinions and interpretations as facts of the world. 
In turn, the sensation that internally held beliefs are objective facts of reality can 
increase confidence as well. Thus, living in these bubbles can be another source of 
miscalibration. 
But, as we realize the omnipresence of miscalibrating stimuli and opportunities for 
self-fulfilling influences on our personal experiences, should we avoid them or embrace 
them? Most likely we should sometimes avoid and other times embrace them and we 
should invest on understanding when to do one or the other. 
Enhanced subjective experiences due to overconfidence in decision skills can be 
beneficial in several ways. They might, for instance, reduce tension and stimulate 
engagement with cognitive tasks in certain domains. Think of a person who is interested 
in learning more about the history of her or his country and is looking for a 
documentary about it. Suppose that person chooses and watches a documentary under 
the influence of a positive illusion such as Google-induced overconfidence. The self-
fulfilling effect might make the documentary experience more enjoyable and, 
consequently, motivate the person to keep pursuing more history knowledge. Moreover, 
to the extent that many of our experiential choices serve to isolate us from external 
stressors that cannot be avoided in other situations of the daily life, the self-fulfilling 
effect of overconfidence can help steer clear of tensions related to the decision process 
that can undermine the pleasure from the experience. Thus, positive illusions and their 
self-fulfilling influence might contribute for the effectiveness of personal experiences 
intended for relaxation and recovery from stress. 
Nevertheless, there are pitfalls to these self-fulfilling prophecies as well. One is that 
they reinforce miscalibration because people’s subjective experiences falsely confirm 
choice quality. The other is that they reward miscalibrating behavior such as interacting 
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with technological cognitive aids. This idea implies that the self-fulfilling effect of 
overconfidence on subjective experiences can help understand Internet addiction. 
Exploring downstream consequences Internet-driven enhancements in subjective 
experiences to identify its contributions to phenomena like Internet addiction is an 
important research avenue if we want to understand (and potentially overcome) the 




The current research adds to the empirical evidence of Google-induced 
miscalibration. An important task for future research is to clarify the boundaries of this 
phenomenon. 
Thus far, there is only evidence of two factors that limit the effects of Internet search 
on memory (see Ward, 2013b). One such factor is familiarity with the search tool: 
Internet search assisted by unfamiliar search engines seems to highlight the presence of 
the external source of information and reduce misattribution of knowledge. The other 
factor is the difficulty level of the “question” to be answered with the assistance of 
online search: metacognitive miscalibration does not seem to be an issue when the 
knowledge accessed on Google is related to easy or difficult problems, but only with 
moderately difficult ones. Considering this condition, it is important to understand how 
question difficulty plays out in natural Internet search behavior. One possibility is that 
most things we search online are inspired by moderately difficult questions because 
easy questions do not make us experience doubt and rather difficult questions are 
unlikely to emerge in our thoughts because we are not able to formulate them. 
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The question difficulty boundary can also be examined from the point of view of 
user expertise. If Google effects experiments take into account participants’ prior 
knowledge of the topics, they might find null results among novices (for whom the 
stimulus topic might be too difficult to grasp) and experts (for whom they might be too 
easy). However, initial tests of the moderating effect of expertise show only a linear 
moderation where the lower the level of expertise the stronger the effect of Internet 
search, with the effect being null among those with the highest levels of expertise (Ward 
et al., 2018). The analysis of natural Internet search behavior remains relevant from the 
point of view of user expertise; people might be unlikely to search topics in which they 
are experts (because they do not need to access external information on such topics) or 
about which they have no prior knowledge (because they do not have enough 
knowledge to start the search). 
An interesting aspect of the analysis of the influence of people’s expertise on 
Google effects is that it focuses on characteristics of the individual that make her or him 
more or less sensitive to these effects. A similar characteristic worth looking into is 
Internet (or computer) fluency. Based on the discussion about knowledge misattribution 
(see “RESEARCH BACKGROUND I: VIRTUAL CONFIDENCE IN DECISION 
SKILLS”), the more one is a stranger to the use of the Internet as a memory resource, 
the more salient the presence of the external source of information should be. 
Internet fluency might have different implications if we examine how it affects 
digital natives vs. digital immigrants. On the one hand, people born into the digital 
world might have a more intense self-extension relationship with the Internet and 
connection devices because these resources have been part of their lives since their early 
stages of mental development. From this point of view, disentangling their own 
performance from the performance of the Internet might be trickier and Google-induced 
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feelings of already knowing should be more likely to arise. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that interactions with technology in the early stages of the development of a 
sense of self actually help the mind learn how to separate the self along with one’s 
internal resources from external technological resources like Google. During the first 
months of life, interpersonal relations provide foundational input to the formation of an 
initial sense of self (Case, 1991). The way information from these relations and from 
observing other human beings is absorbed and assimilated in those early stages and 
concomitant interaction with the Internet might illuminate the differences between one’s 
own human capacities and technological extensions. As a consequence, the digital 
native mind could become proficient in keeping track of internally held knowledge and 
information accessed online. 
Shifting the focus away from individual characteristics, an issue that remains 
unclarified in empirical research is the role of the format of the information retrieved 
from the Internet. So far, studies have explored access to information in the form of 
quick answers and online articles, but the Internet provides information “in all shapes 
and colors.” For instance, many people look for videos when they search the Internet, 
especially if they do not expect a short answer. Elements that can be present in a video, 
such as the voice and image of a person conveying the information, can highlight the 
exogenous nature of the information and reduce knowledge misattribution. 
Particular to decision contexts, another external factor that might inhibit Google-
induced overconfidence is the consequential weight of the decision task. As 
aforementioned, personal decisions involve consequences that will be faced in the 
future. Because of this, personal decisions are made with a forward-looking perspective 
that might stimulate revisions of decision criteria and processes, which, in turn, might 
clarify one’s actual aptitude to make the decision. When there is not much at stake, 
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these revisions might be bypassed. However, decisions that entail more drastic 
consequences, such as the investment of a substantial portion of one’s financial 
resources or permanent physical changes, should stimulate more careful revisions. As a 
consequence, there is a greater chance that one will develop a more accurate grasp of 
one’s own decision skills when faced with more serious and consequential decision 
tasks. 
 
In the “real world” 
 
In the current and previous works, Google effects have been studied in considerably 
artificial settings. The benefit of the experimental procedures adopted in these works is 
that they clarify the nature of these effects and how they unfold. The flipside is that they 
disregard a number of aspects of the way people use the Internet and make personal 
decisions in the “real world.” An important step to be taken in research on Google 
effects is the investigation of how the findings from the laboratorial settings play out in 
the field. 
The search tasks of the experiments presented here (and in related works) provided 
participants with the topics they should search and answers would either appear in the 
form of quick answers or on a webpage participants were instructed to fing (in either 
case, not much search effort was required after typing the search term and pressing the 
Enter key). The advantage of this approach is that information exposure tends to be the 
same for all participants6; at the same time, online search often involves sometimes not 
knowing exactly what to search and how identify the right answer. 
                                                          
6 Differences in search task and information exposure might still arise due to Google’s personalized 
search, which can produce different quick answers or orders of webpage links on the results page 
depending on the user (Parisier, 2011). 
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By providing participants with the topics, the expertiments emulate situations in 
which people are exposed to cues of how to search the Internet (what to type into the 
search box). This is one way people engage in online search: they are exposed to terms 
and concepts that elicit doubt and then look for clarification online. But sometimes we 
are not really sure how to tell Google what we wan. Imagine, for instance, a graduate 
student who is interested in learning more about cosmographs because she or he saw 
one in a conferece presentation, but the student does not know that it is called a 
cosmograph, she or he only knows what it looks like and has a sense of what it shows. 
How does one learn more about cosmographs on Google without knowing the word 
“cosmograph”? And how does the process of coming up with questions and testing 
different search terms affect the way Google influences confidence and subjetive 
experiences? 
Internet search also might involve not knowing how to navigate through Google’s 
results very clearly. By telling participants that they were looking for the information in 
Google’s “Answer Box” or in a specific website, the experiments reported here 
emulated situations in which the user has a sense of where to look for information 
within the Google environment. Indeed, we often read Google’s quick answer and do 
not look further, or we engage in Internet search with a specific page in mind, like 
Wikipedia or Reddit. But it is also true that sometimes we go from one page to another 
until we find one that is helpful. This process makes access to the target information 
slower and more demanding and, therefore, might highlight the external source and 
diminish Google effects on confidence. 
As we try to understand how Google effects on confidence emerge in the “real 
world,” it is crucial to observe and have a critical interpretation of the effect sizes 
evidenced in the current set of studies, which mostly of a small magnitude. According 
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to Cohen’s (1988) references, the observed Google effects on the feeling of already 
knowing new information were of a medium magnitude, and effects on confidence in 
decision skills were medium (Study 1) or between small and medium (Study 3), with ds 
close to 0.50 (for confidence, between 0.20 and 0.50 in Study 3) and ƞ2 close to 0.06. As 
we move further from the Google stimulus in the chain of effects and closer to 
participants’ enjoyment of their experiences, as one would expect, effect sizes decrease. 
According to Cohen’s (1988) references, all effect sizes on variables measured after the 
film experiences in Studies 4 and 5 are considered small (with ds close 0.2 and ƞ2 close 
to 0.01). However, the effects observed here arose from a short search task (3 to 5 
topics) that does not capture the intensity of our use of the Internet. To better understand 
how the influence of Google on confidence and experiences plays out in people’s lives, 
we need to start exploring how often these effects occur, the extent to which they 
increase as a function of search activity, and how long they endure. The “real world” 
impact of Internet-driven miscalibration might not be on the magnitude of the effects, 
but on how frequent and enduring they are. It is also possible that these effects have 
cumulative properties that make them increase in size at every new occurrence, in which 
case search activities should be managed to keep the miscalibration at “healthy levels.” 
In sum, factors related to how search activities occur in natural environments might 
elucidate the impact of Google effects in more informative ways than the effect sizes 






The opening line of this manuscript relates to concepts and findings that permeate 
the research on Internet-induced metacognitive errors (including the material presented 
here). To the extent that we incorporate the Internet as an extension of our own 
cognitive faculties, what we access through the computer, tablet, and smartphone 
screens does, in some way, becomes part of who we are. It feels as if that content came 
from us and is part of our own thoughts. It changes how we perceive ourselves in the 
world (by, for instance, making us feel as more capable to interact with this world) and 
how we experience it (by making some things we choose to invest our time and 
attention on more enjoyable). 
However, in principle, those words were not about the Internet. They were Mister 
Rogers’ thoughts about the television, back when it was cutting-edge technology. When 
the T.V. screen became a ubiquitous presence in American houses, critics and 
researchers started thinking about how effectively the television grabbed people’s 
attention and its potentially addictive properties. Eventually, it was found that concealed 
consequences of using the television as a source of information and entertainment like 
sustained attention and “addictiveness” could be capitalized on for educational 
purposes, vide Mister Rogers himself (Neville, Capotosto, & Ma, 2018) and Sezame 
Street (Morrow, 2005). If these anecdotes from the times when the television was the 
game-changing device can inspire the way we make the Internet part of our lives, 
perhaps we can be more like Micah Altman and less like Nicholas Carr when someone 
asks us what we think about the Internet – perhaps we can be more optimistic about 
where society is heading with it. 
If what we see on our T.V., computer, tablet, and smartphone screens is part of who 
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Test of topics and online information used in Phase 1 of all studies. 
 
Previous research has shown that using Internet search to access answers that are 
either too easy or too hard to come up with might not induce miscalibration (Ward, 
2013b). Because of this, questions used in the studies presented here were tested in 
separate samples. In the test, participants would be presented with a topic intended to be 
used in a study on one page and the answer extracted from Google (specifically, the 
relevant quick answer when the stimulus question pertained to Studies 2, 4, or 5, or the 
target article when the stimulus question pertained to Studies 1 or 3). After reading the 
answer, participants were asked, “How difficult it is to come up with an answer like the 
one you read on the previous page?” A 7-point scale was used to answer the question. 
The points of the scale were not numbered. Instead, each point contained a label: 
Extremely easy, Moderately easy, Slightly easy, Neither easy nor difficult, Slightly 
difficult, Moderately difficult, Extremely difficult, in this order from left to right. 
 To avoid an undermining influence information complexity on the studies by 
exposing participants to answers that were either too simple or too complex, only 
answers within the range of Slightly easy to Slightly difficult were used. With this in 
mind, difficulty evaluations of all the topics were tested for significant differences from 




Test of topics for Studies 1 and 3: 
Topic N Mean SE 
Test 
H0: mean = 2 H0: mean = 6 
How to avoid 
credit card and 
ATM fees while 
traveling 
abroad? 
29 4.55 0.29 t(28) = 8.87, p < .001 t(28) = 5.04, p < .001 
What to avoid in 
Amsterdam? 
34 4.68 0.29 t(33) = 9.18, p < .001 t(33) = 4.54, p < .001 
How to 
communicate 
with locals in 
Italy? 
31 3.77 0.33 t(30) = 5.34, p < .001 t(30) = 6.67, p < .001 
What happens to 
lost luggage? 
27 4.37 0.39 t(26) = 6.21, p < .001 t(26) = 4.27, p < .001 
How to get 
around in 
Istanbul? 
27 5.07 0.39 t(26) = 7.92, p < .001 t(26) = 2.38, p = .025 
 
Test of topics for Study 2: 
Topic N Mean SE 
Test 
H0: mean = 2 H0: mean = 6 
How to avoid 
credit card and 
ATM fees while 
traveling 
abroad? 
29 4.55 0.29 t(28) = 8.87, p < .001 t(28) = 5.04, p < .001 
What to avoid in 
Amsterdam? 
34 4.68 0.29 t(33) = 9.18, p < .001 t(33) = 4.54, p < .001 
How to 
communicate 
with locals in 
Italy? 
31 3.77 0.33 t(30) = 5.34, p < .001 t(30) = 6.67, p < .001 
What happens to 
lost luggage? 





Topic N Mean SE 
Test 
H0: mean = 2 H0: mean = 6 
How to get 
around in 
Istanbul? 
27 5.07 0.39 t(26) = 7.92, p < .001 t(26) = 2.38, p = .025 
How to use your 
driver license 
abroad? 
30 4.6 0.3 t(29) = 8.73, p < .001 t(29) = 4.70, p < .001 
What are the 
most visited 
countries in the 
world? 
31 3.77 0.28 t(30) = 6.31, p < .001 t(30) = 7.92, p < .001 
What are the 
best destinations 
in Italy? 
31 2.97 0.31 t(30) = 3.16, p = .004 t(30) = 9.92, p < .001 
How do budget 
airlines work? 




32 2.86 0.23 t(31) = 3.84, p < .001 t(31) = 13.72, p < .001 
 
Test of topics for Studies 4 and 5: 
Topic N Mean SE 
Test 




30 4.83 0.33 t(31) = 3.84, p < .001 t(31) = 3.84, p < .001 
What is a 
Schengen Visa? 
28 4.48 0.4 t(27) = 6.22, p < .001 t(27) = , p < .001 
What is a TSA-
approved 
padlock? 
33 2.91 0.26 t(32) = 3.63, p = .001 t(32) = 12.12, p < .001 














Topics and websites used for the experimental induction in Studies 1 and 3. 
Topic Website 
1. "How to avoid credit card and ATM 
fees while traveling abroad?" 
usatoday.com 
2. "What to avoid in Amsterdam?" amsterdam.info 
3. "How to communicate with locals 
in Italy?" 
expatfocus.com 
4. "What happens to lost luggage?" telegraph.co.uk 











Acquisition of information (AI) .92 
1. I know where to find information I need prior to making a 
travel related decision. 
2. I know where to look to find travel information I need. 
3. I am confident about my ability to research about traveling. 
4. I know the right questions to cover when preparing for a trip. 
5. I have the skills to obtain needed information before making 
important travel decisions. 
 
 
Consideration-set formation (CSF) .88 
6. I am confident about my ability to recognize options (e.g., 
locations, attractions, hotels etc) worth considering when 
traveling or planning a trip. 
7. I can tell which options (e.g., locations, attractions, hotels etc) 
will meet my expectations when I travel or plan a trip. 
8. I trust my own judgement when deciding which options (e.g., 
locations, attractions, hotels etc) to consider while I am 
traveling or planning a trip. 
9. I can focus easily on a few options (e.g., locations, attractions, 
hotels etc) when I travel or plan a trip. 
 
 
Personal outcomes (PO) .85 
(all items were reverse coded for the analysis) 
10. I often have doubts about the travel decisions I make. 
11. I frequently agonize over what to do/buy travel wise. 
12. I often wonder if I've made the right selection of options (e.g., 
locations, attractions, hotels etc) when I travel. 
13. I never seem to choose the right thing for me when it comes to 
traveling. 
14. Too often my travel experiences are not very satisfying. 
 
 
Social outcomes (SO) .91 
(all items were reverse coded for the analysis) 
15. My friends are impressed with my ability to handle myself 
when I travel. 
16. I impress people with my trips. 











Persuasion knowledge (PK) .87 
18. When it comes to traveling, I know when an offer (e.g., a 
flight, a hotel deal etc) is "too good to be true". 
19. When it comes to traveling, I can tell when an offer (e.g., a 
flight, a hotel deal etc) has strings attached. 
20. When I plan trips and travel, I have no trouble understanding 
bargaining tactics used by hotels, airlines, and sales agents. 
21. When I travel, I know when a marketer is pressuring me to buy 
something. 
22. I can see through sales gimmicks used to get tourists to buy 
stuff. 




Marketplace Interfaces (MI) .92 
(all items were reverse coded for the analysis) 
24. I am afraid to "ask to speak to the manager" when it comes to 
purchases related to a trip. 
25. When I travel, I don't like to tell a service provider something 
is wrong with the service. 
26. I am too timid when problems arise while I am traveling. 
27. When I travel, I am hesitant to complain. 
 
 
Consumer self-confidence (CSC) – full scale .84 
 
 
